COMMON CAUSE" A REGISTERED SOCIETY DIRECTOR Vs. UNION OF INDIA

LAWS(SC)-1996-11-225

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided on November 28,1996

"Common Cause", A Registered Society Through Its Director (Ii) Appellant

VERSUS

Union of India And Ors Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) We have heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties concerned in the present proceedings. Having given our anxious consideration to their contentions, we deem it fit to clarify, modify our judgment in "Common Cause ", A Registered Society v. Union of India, 1997(2) GLR 1297 as under : I. The time-limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paras 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused concerned or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of para 2 despite full co-operation by the accused concerned to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the accused concerned, nor is such delay caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher Courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per paras 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials against them. II. The phrase "pendency of trials" as employed in paras 1(a) to 1(c) and the phrase "non-commencement of trial" as employed in paras 2(b) to 2(f) shall be construed as under : (i) In cases of trials before the Sessions Court the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Sec. 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the cases concerned. (ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports the trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Sec. 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant cases by Magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on police report such trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed against the accused concerned under Sec. 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by Magistrates the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appear or are brought before the Magistrate are asked under Sec. 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make. III. In para 4 of our judgment in the list of offences to which directions contained in paras 1 and 2 shall not apply, the following additions shall be made : (n) matrimonial offences under Indian Penal Code including Sec. 498-A or under any other law for the time being in force; (o) offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act including offences under Sec. 138 thereof; (p) offences relating to criminal misappropriation of property of the complainant as well as offences relating to criminal breach of trust under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law for the time being in force; (q) offences under Sec. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code or any offence pertaining to rash and negligent acts which are made punishable under any other law for the time being in force; (r) offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals as listed in Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code or such offences under any other law for the time being in force. It is further directed that in criminal cases pertaining to offences mentioned under the above additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to our judgment dated 1-5-1996 (supra) and they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as aforesaid, the criminal Court concerned shall suo motu or on application by the aggrieved parties concerned shall issue within three months of the receipt of this clarificatory order at their end, summons or warrants, as the case may be, to such discharged or acquitted accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them or being proceeded further in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that in trials regarding other offences which are covered by the time-limit specified in our earlier order dated 1-5-1996 (supra) wherein the accused concerned are already acquitted or discharged pursuant to the said order, such acquitted or discharged accused shall not be liable to be recalled for facing such trials pursuant to the present clarificatory order which qua such offences will be treated to be purely prospective and no such cases which are already closed shall be reopened pursuant to the present order. IV. Copies of this clarificatory order shall be communicated by the Office of this Court to all the High Courts, Chief Secretaries of all the States and the administrative heads concerned of all the Union Territories. Registrars of the High Courts shall be requested by the Office to communicate copies of this clarificatory order to all the criminal Courts under the control and superintendence of the respective High Courts with direction to send compliance reports to the High Courts concerned within three months from the date of receipt of communication of this clarificatory order at their end. I.A.s Nos. 3-6 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in the light of this clarificatory order. Directions issued.;

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