FAZL ALI - (1.) THIS is an appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by Venkata Reddy who was respondent No. 1 in the election petition filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The appeal arises out of the general elections held to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in March 1972 from Gooty Assembly constituency. The appellant Venkata Reddy T. Papa Sab and R. Sultan (the election petitioner before the High Court) applied for congress ticket for the Gooty Assembly Constituency seat. The District Congress Committee, Anantapur recommended the names of R. Sultan, Papa Sab and Ramachandra Goud but did not recommended the name of the appellant. The Andhra Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee, however, recommended the name of R. Sultan the first respondent alone. THIS recommendation appears to have been accepted by the All India Congress Committee which gave the congress ticket to the first respondent R. Sultan on 1/02/1972 as a result thereof the other candidates, namely, the appellant Venkata Reddy, T. Papa Sab and Venkata Subbayya decided to contest the election as independent candidates, whereas Venkata Naidu got the Congress (O) ticket. The polling to the aforesaid constituency was held on 8/03/1972 and counting was done on 12/03/1972 on which date the result was also declared. The appellant was declared elected having secured 19,974 votes polled in the constituency Respondent No. 1 R. Sultan lost by a narrow margin of 471 votes having polled 19,503 votes. The other respondents were accordingly defeated and we are not at all concerned with their cases.
(2.) RESPONDENT No. 1 R. Sultan filed an election petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 20/04/1972 which was assigned to Sriramulu, J., who tried the election petition. For the sake of convenience we shall refer Venkata Reddy as the appellant and R. Sultan who was the election petitioner before the High Court as the contesting respondent. The contesting respondent sought to challenge the election of the appellant on various grounds and alleged that the appellant had indulged in a large number of corrupt practices as envisaged by Section 123 of the Act, namely, bribery, corruption, communal propaganda, impersonation of voters, excessive expenses, improper rejection and reception of ballot papers etc. The contesting respondent also filed an application before the trial Juge that as number of irregularities were committed in the rejection and acceptance of the ballot papers, the Court should allow scrutiny and recounting of the votes. The Court, after considering the evidence of the parties on this point, eventually allowed the application, but ultimately it held that even if there was any irregularity it had no caused any material change in the election. The petition was resisted by the appellant who emphatically denied all the allegations made by the contesting respondent and submitted that the elections were free and fair and that the appellant had not indulged in any corrupt partice at all. The appellant further pleaded that all the allegations made by the contesting respondent were figment of his imagination and were totally untrue. On the question of corrupt practices, particularly the distribution of objectionable pamphlets, as the contesting respondent had not given full and material particulars in his election petition, the appellant filed an application on 7/07/1972 praying that the Court may direct the contesting respondent to file better particulars by way of amendment. The Court directed the contesting respondent to supply fresh particulars and accordingly the contesting respondent filed his application for amendment by incorporating material particulars on 29/08/1972. On the pleadings of the parties the High Court framed as many as 35 issues in the present case. After taking the evidence of the parties the Court decided all the issues against the contesting respondent except issues Nos. 7, 26 and 27 which were decided in favour of the contesting respondent. In view of the findings given by the learned Judge the election of the appellant was set aside, but the learned Judge refused to grant the relief to the contesting respondent for being declared as duly elected to the seat in question. It is against this decision that the appellant has come up to this Court in appeal. Mr. P. Bassi Reddy learned counsel for the appellant has assailed before us the findings of the High Court on issues Nos. 7, 26 and 27 as these were the only issues which affected the appellant. Mr. B. Shiv Sankar, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has endeavoured to support the judgment of the High Court by submitting that the findings arrived at by the High Court were based on a correct and proper appreciation of the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the record. In a democracy such as ours, the purity and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be give due respect and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. It is well settled that the onus lies heavily on the election petitioner to make out a strong case for setting aside an election. In our country election is a fairly costly and expensive venture and the Representation of the People Act has provided sufficient safeguards to make the elections fair and free. In these circumstances, therefore, election results cannot be lightly brushed aside in election disputes. At the same time it is necessary to protect the purity and sobriety of the elections by ensuring that the candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people by undue influence. fraud, communal propaganda, bribery or other corrupt practices as laid down in the Act. Another principle that is equally well settled is that the election petitioner in order to succeed must plead all material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. The allegations of corrupt practices being in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt. Where the election petitioner seeks to prove charge by purely qartisan evidence consisting of his workers, agents, supporters and friends, the Court would have to approach the evidence with great care and caution, scrutiny and circumspection, and would, as a matter of prudence though not as a rule of law, require corroboration of such evidence from independent ouarters, unless the Court is fully satisfied that the evidence is so credit-worthy and true, spotless and blemishless, cogent and consistent, that no corroboration to lend further assurance is necessary. It has to be borne in mind that the attempt of the agents or supporters of the defeated candidate is always to get the election set aside by means fair or foul and the evidence of such witnesses, therefore, must be regarded as highly interested and tainted evidence which should be acted upon only if the Court is satisfied that the evidence is true and does not suffer from any infirmity. Where, however, the evidence led by the election petitioner even though consistent is fraught with inherent improbabilities and replete with unnatural tendencies, the Court may refuse to accept such evidence. because consistency alone is not the conclusive test of truth. Judicial experience shows that sometimes even a tutored or parrot like evidence can be consistent and free from discrepancies and yet not worthy of credence. It is, however, difficult to lay down a rule of universal application because each case will have to be decided on its own facts, but in appreciating the evidence the broad features mentioned above must be borne in mind and have been emphasised by this Court in a large catena of decisions - a few of them may be referred to here.
(3.) IN Bhanu Kumar v. Mohan Lal., (1971) I SCC 370 = (AIR 1971 SC 2025) this Court observed as follows: "Allegation of corrupt practice is a charge of criminal nature. The provisions in the Representation of the People Act are intended to preserve the purity of the election but at the same time these provisions should not be subverted for the impure purposes of maligning candidates who happen to be in the Government on the eve of the election. The Court is always vigilant to watch not only the conduct of the candidates and to protect their character from being defamed but also to see that the character and conduct of the public is not corroded by corrupt motive or evil purposes of candidates. The genuine and bona fide aims and aspirations of candidates have to be protected on the one hand and mala fide abuse and arrogance of power will have to be censured on the other.'' Similarly in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed, (1974) 2 SCC 660 = (AIR 1975 SC 290) Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court most lucidly and aptly observed as follows: "An election once held is not to be treated in a light-hearted manner and defeated candidates or disgruntled electors should not get away with it by filing election petitions on unsubstantial grounds and irresponsible evidence, thereby introducing a serious element of uncertainty in the verdict already rendered by the electorate. An election is a politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one official, but of the collective will of the whole constituency. Courts naturally must respect this public expression secretly written and show extreme reluctance to set aside or declare void an election which has already been held unless clear and cogent testimony compelling the court to uphold the corrupt practice alleged against the returned candidate is adduced. Indeed election petitions where corrupt practices are imputed must be regarded as proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature wherein strict proof is necessary. The burden is therefore heavy on him who assails an election which has been concluded.'' To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Abdul Hussain Mir v. Shamsul Huda, (1975) 4 SCC 533 = (AIR 1975 SC 1612), where this Court observed as follows: "Even so, certain basic legal guidelines cannot be lost sight of while adjudging an election dispute. The verdict at the polls wears a protective mantle in a democratic polity. The Court will vacate such ballot count return only on proof beyond reasonable doubt of corrupt practices. Charges, such as have been imputed here, are viewed as quasi-criminal, carrying other penalties from losing a seat, and strong testimony is needed to subvert a Returning Officer's declaration. When elections are challenged on grounds with a criminal taint, the benefit of doubt in testimonial matters belongs to the returned candidate. Similarly in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh, (1968) 3 SCR 102 = (AIR 1968 SC 1191), while emphasizing the standard of proof in an election case for a corrupt practice of bribery, Hidayatullah J., as he then was, speaking for the Court observed thus: "In Anjanaya Reddy v. Gangil Reddy, 21 ELR 247 - it was held that the proof required to establish a corrupt practice must be almost of the character required to establish a criminal charge. In our opinion the law requires that a corrupt practice involving bribery must be fully established. The evidence must show clearly that the promise or gift directly or indirectly was made to an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election.'' ;