Krishna Iyer, J. - (1.) The appellant, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, has by special leave come up in appeal attacking the decree of the High Court which affirmed the concurrent judgements of thecourts below declaring the order of dismissal of the respondent void.
(2.) The facts so far as they are relevant for thisappeal may be briefly set out.Therespondent was a Sewer Inspector appointed in 1958 by the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation. In 1961, he was suspended for alleged delinquency. This was followed by a departmental disciplinary enquiry which resulted in his dismissal by the Deputy Commissioner on October 25, 1962. Of course,this order had been preceded by a regular enquiry after giving an opportunity to the delinquent officerto be heard. After the dismissal order by the Deputy Commissioner, an appeal was carried to the Commissioner by the respondent but it proved fruitless because the Commissionerafterexamining the merits of the matter concurred in the conclusion regarding the guilt and punishment. Thereafter, the respondent brought a suit challenging the validity of the order of dismissaland for a declaration that he is deemed to have continued in service despite the dismissal. He succeeded in the trial Court and the appeals by the Corporation were all dismissed. The main ground on whichthe order of dismissal was set aside was that the appointing authority wasthe Commissioner while the dismissing authority was the Deputy Commissioner. This filesin the face of the proviso to Section 95 (1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 which reads thus: "Provided that no such officer or other employee as aforesaid shall be reduced in rank, compulsorily retired, removed or dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. ********** ". We are satisfied that in thelight of the decision reported in Management D. T. U.v. B. B. L. Hajelay, (1973) 2 SCR 114 the High Court's view is correct. The essence of the matter is the station or rank of the authority empowered to dismiss and the officer subjected to dismissal. That rank cannot be delegatedand therefore the delegate, if he is subordinate, cannotarrogate to himself the power to dismiss which the original appointing authority enjoyed. It follows that the order of dismissal in the present case is bad.
(3.) This does not bring the story to an end. After all an enquiry had been conducted in accordance with the rules and the canons of natural justiceand an enquiry report had been submitted.The illegality crept in when the Deputy Commissioner decided. From then on, what was done was also illegal. We think it correct in law and in accordance with justice to hold that the Commissioner will be entitled to consider the enquiry report with an openmind and reach his own conclusion as to the culpability or otherwise ofthe respondent. It is no longer necessary to hold a fresh enquiry regarding the alleged misconduct since the recordis complete up tothat stage. There is noneed to reopen that part of the proceeding. Of course, when making representations before the Commissioner it may well be open to the respondent to urge any infirmities about the enquiry he may like to press and the Commissioner will give due consideration to it.;