FAZAL ALI, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court deciding a court fee matter in connection with the memorandum of appeal filed by the appellants before the Allahabad High Court against a decree passed by the Tribunal appointed under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 - hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The appellants had filed an application under Section 13 of the Act before the Tribunal alleging that it was a partnership firm and claimed that an amount of Rs. 3,50,000.00 by way of refund of security deposits and a sum of Rs. 55,000.00 as commission was due from the respondents. The application was tried by the Tribunal and the claim preferred by the appellants was ultimately dismissed by the Tribunal by its decree dated 19/05/1965. Additional Civil Judge of Badaun was assigned as the Tribunal under the aforesaid Act. The appellants then filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court with a nominal court fee of Rs. 5.00 but the Stamp Reporter of the High Court was of the opinion that the appellants should have paid ad valorem court fees on the total claim preferred by the appellants before the Tribunal which had been disallowed. The matter was taken up by the Taxing Officer, who, in view of the substantial importance of the point raised, made a reference to the Taxing Judge for deciding the court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal in the instant case. The plea of the appellants was that as the decision of the Tribunal did not amount to a decree as contemplated by Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ad valorem court fees were not payable and the appellants were entitled to pay court fees as prescribed in Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court-fees Act. The stand taken by the revenue was that as the present appeal was against a decree, the case of the appellants squarely feel within the ambit of Section 4 of the Court-fees Act and therefore ad valorem court-fees were payable under Sch. I Art. 1 of the Court-fees Act. The matter was taken up by the Taxing Judge who went into the question of law raised before him and after considering some authorities, particularly those of the Allahabad High Court, agreed with the Stamp Reporter and came to the conclusion that the appellants should pay ad valorem court-fees under Sch. I Art. 1 of the Court-fees Act. The Taxing Judge accordingly by his order dated 11/10/1966 directed the appellants to make up the deficiency in the payment of the court-fees. It was against this order that the appellants filed a petition for special leave to this Court which having been granted the appeal has now been placed before us for hearing.
(2.) THIS appeal involves a short but substantial question of law as to the interpretation, scope and ambit of Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court-fees Act as applicable to appeals preferred against the orders or decrees passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. The point is not free from difficulty and there appears to be a serious divergence of judicial opinion on the question as to whether in appeals like the present, Sch. I Art. 1 or Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court-fees Act would apply. Mr. Goyal learned counsel appearing for the appellants raised two points before us. In the first place he contended that as the proceedings before the Tribunal were not proceedings in a Civil Court nor was the Tribunal a Court, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal even though loosely called as a decree is not a decree as contemplated by Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the case of the appellants clearly falls within the ambit of Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court-fees Act. It was next contended that as the Tribunal had disallowed the claim of the appellants by the order impugned before the High Court the order did not amount to any decree and, therefore, the question of payment of ad valorem court-fees did not arise. In this connection it was also submitted that the Act being a beneficial statute was designed to provide a cheap and expeditious remedy to displaced persons in certain circumstances and therefore the Parliament never intended that displaced persons who had lost all that they possessed in Pakistan should be made to pay ad valorem court-fees without possessing the capacity to do so. Mr. Dikshit appearing for the respondents sought to repel the arguments of Mr. Goyal on two grounds. In the first place it was submitted that under the provisions of the Court-fees Act the order of the Taxing Judge was final and could not be re-opened by this Court even in special leave. Secondly, it was submitted that the Tribunal was nothing but a Civil Court and the provisions of the Act would show that the Tribunal was clothed with all the powers and incidents of a Civil Court. In these circumstance it was contended that any decree which was passed by the Tribunal must be presumed to be a decree of the Court and was made appealable as such under Section 40 of the Act. Therefore, it was said, Sch. II Art. 11 had absolutely no application and the view taken by the Taxing Judge was legally correct.
(3.) IN order to understand the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties it may be necessary for us to trace the history of the Act and the circumstances in which it was passed. To begin with, following the partition of the country there was an unprecedented rush of refugees from Pakistan to INdia and our country immediately after becoming independent had to face the colossal problem of rehabilitating the refugees or the displaced persons. Most of these persons had left huge assets behind in Pakistan and had come to this country without a penny. Others were creditors and were entitled to get their debts liquidated from the assets in this country or from the properties possessed by the Banks in this country. Soon after independence there were stray and piecemeal legislations providing for some facilities for displaced debtors and creditors but there was no uniform law to cater to their growing needs in view of the situation faced by them following the partition of our country. IN these circumstances, therefore, the Government decided to bring out a uniform legislation so as to be a complete code in itself providing for a cheap and expeditious remedy for displaced debtors and creditors. The matter was first entrusted to a Committee and then to Bind Basni Prasad, a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court, who after taking evidence of a large number of displaced persons and examining the nature of the claims, submitted a report which formed the basis of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act. INtroducing the Bill which preceded the Act. Mr. A. P. Jain, the then Minster of State for Rehabilitation, made a long speech in Parliament dwelling on the various aspects of the Bill. The Minister particularly highlighted the fact that the condition of the displaced persons was pitiable as they had left huge assets behind in Pakistan. IN this connection the Minister observed thus: "The condition of the displaced persons therefore today is that while their assets have been left behind in Pakistan and they have brought the titles of their property, at least in some cases." "IN the provisions contained in this Bill, we have tried to strike a balance between the reduced capacity of the debtor to meet his obligations and at the same time we have taken sufficient care to see that a debtor who is in a position to pay may not deny payment to his creditor." "IN this Bill, we have introduced what might be called a somewhat revolutionary principle, namely, that no debtor will be called upon to pay more than his paying capacity. I shall later on define what the words 'paying capacity' mean, but here it may be enough to mention that paying capacity of a debtor has been defined in a rather liberal manner after allowing fairly large assets which will not be capable of attachment." "Clause 13 deals with claims by displaced creditors against persons who are not displaced debtors. That is not comparatively so important because it only gives relief in respect of court-fees. We felt that under the depressed economic condition of the displaced creditors, it is necessary that we must give them some relief against the huge amount of money which they have to pay as court-fees etc." "I submit that these are all very necessary and humane considerations which take into account the actual paying capacity of the debtor." "We have maintained the existing procedure in the Courts but we have simplified it because a prolonged procedure and the complexities of the civil courts mean a lot of money. We have provided only one appeal in clause 40." A perusal of the above observations will give a clear insight into the various objects of the Act and the main purposes which the legislation sought to achieve. It will be noticed that the Minister laid particular strees on the paying capacity of the debtors which he called a humane consideration and also described the necessity of giving relief to the displaced persons against the huge amount of money which they may have to pay as court-fees. Thus it would appear that the intention of Parliament was to bring out a legislation which would provide for a cheap and expeditious remedy to the displaced persons and entrust the work to a Tribunal which may be able to decide the claims quickly instead of leaving the displaced debtors of creditors to follow the dilatory and cumbersome process of the civil courts. In order to shorten the litigation the Minister expressly stated that only one appeal had been provided in Section 40 of the Act, to the High Court. These matters will have a very important bearing on the interpretation of the provisions of the Court-fees Act as applicable to the decrees passed by a Tribunal under the Act. Even apart from these considerations, it is well settled that in case of a fiscal statute the provisions must be strictly interpreted giving every benefit of doubt to the subject and lightening as far as possible the burden of court-fees on the litigant. Thus where an adjudication given by a Tribunal could fall within two provisions of the Court Fees Act, one of which was onerous for the litigant and the other more liberal, the Court would apply that provision which was beneficial to the litigant. In A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, 1957 SCR 837 = (AIR 1957 SC 657) while interpreting the provisions of a fiscal statute, viz., the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, this Court observed as follows: "It is no doubt true that in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed, If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter." Similarly in State of Maharashtra v. Mishra Lal Tarachand, (1964) 5 SCR 230 = (AIR 1964 SC 457), while interpreting some of the provisions of the Bombay Court-fees Act, Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the Court observed as follows: "The Act is a taxing statute and its provisions therefore have to be construed strictly, in favour of the subject-litigant." ;