Hidayatullah, J. - (1.) This appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta. December 5, 1961, arises from a suit between landlord and tenant. The Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (appellant) is the landlord and Biswanath Sonar (respondent) is the tenant and the tenancy is in respect of a piece of land with a rent of Rs. 4 per month. According to the Company the tenancy commenced in December 1938 and according to the tenant in the beginning of 1935. The two court of fact have found in favour of the Company on this point and the High Court has very properly accepted this concurrent finding but has held that tenancy began on the 1st of December, 1938, but more of that later. The suit was commenced in the Court of the Munsif at Asansol by the Company after serving a notice dated June 28, 1950, terminating the alleged monthly tenancy of the respondent with the expiry of December 1950. The notice was served on June 29, 1950. The Company asked for the relief of khas possession by evicting the tenant and reserved the relief of compensation for wrongful occupation after January 1, 1951, for a separate suit. The Company offered to pay such reasonable compensation for structures on the land as the court might determine. The respondent claimed benefit of S. 9 (1) (iii) of the Bengal Non Agricultural Tenancy Act under which, he submitted, his tenancy could not be determined except by service of six months notice in writing expiring with the year of tenancy. He contended that the notice served on the 29th of June terminating the tenancy at the end of December 1950, was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act as the tenancy commenced in the beginning of 1935, and therefore the suit was not maintainable. The learned Munsif held the notice to be proper and decreed the suit. On appeal the Additional District Judge, Asansol confirmed the decree passed by the Munsif. On second appeal a learned single Judge in the High Court reversed the decision of the two courts below and ordered the dismissal of the suit. He followed a decision of a Special Bench of his Court reported in the Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs. Baker Ali, AIR 1961 Cal 515 (SB) which had approved of two unreported decisions of the same Court reported in Sudhindra Nath Roy vs. Haran Chandra Mistry, (S. A. No. 879 of 1950, D/- 25-1-1955 (Cal), and Narayan Chandra Sen vs. Sripati Charan Kumar, (S. A. No. 425 of 1952, D/- 9-8-1955 (Cal). The learned single Judge refused leave to file an appeal under the Letters Patent but the appellant was granted special leave by this Court to appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge.
(2.) In this appeal two questions arise namely, (i) whether the provisions of S. 9(1) (iii) of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act apply to the present tenancy, and (ii) whether the notice served upon the respondent complied with the terms of the Act. In so far as the first question is concerned no further facts are necessary. This question should have given no difficulty but for the fact that the language of the enactment is far from clear.. Section 9 (1) (iii) reads as follows: "9. Incidents of non-agricultural tenancies held for less than twelve years. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, if any non-agricultural land has been held for a term of more than one year but less than twelve years - (a) under a lease in writing for a term of more than one year but less than twelve years to which the provisions of clause (5) of Section 7 do not apply, or (b) without a lease in writing, or (c) under a lease in writing but no term is specified in such lease, then the tenant holding such non-agricultural land shall be liable to ejectment on one or more of the following grounds and not otherwise, namely:- (i) ********** (ii) ********** (iii) on the ground that the tenancy has been terminated by the landlord by six months' notice in writing expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy served on the tenant in the prescribed manner in clause (b): Provided that a tenant shall not be liable to ejectment on the ground specified in clause (iii) except on payment of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant or if they do not agree, as may be determined by the Court on the application of the landlord or such tenant. ********** ********** " Difficulties arise in connection with two expressions in this section. Firstly, what is meant by the phrase "for a term of more than one year but less than twelve years" in the opening part, and, secondly, what is meant by the phrase "six months" notice in writing expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy". The appellant contends that the first phrase contemplates tenancies in which the agreed duration under a contract is more than one year but less than 12 years and the second phrase means that the notice in writing must expire with the end of the year of the tenancy when the tenancy is from year to year and with the end of the term when it is more than one year's duration. The respondent contends that the two phrases respectively describe the duration for which non-agricultural land must actually be held and that the notice of six months must end on the anniversary of the commencement of the tenancy. The appellant's contention shortly stated, is that a monthly tenancy cannot get the benefit of S. 9 (l) (iii) however long the occupation of the land. Both sides agree that this is non-agricultural land and that the tenancy is from month to month. It has also been found that it is a monthly tenancy. If the provisions of S. 9(1) (iii) apply also to a monthly tenant who has been in possession of land for more than a year, then the respondent will he protected from eviction, otherwise not. This depends on what is meant by the two phrases we have referred to earlier.
(3.) The construction of the first phrase is rendered difficult because the Act does not use the words strictly in the same sense throughout. Sometimes the word "term" is used to indicate a period of time without any reference to a contract determining it and sometimes to a period settled, agreed or determined by a contract. In S. 9 (1) (iii) the word "term" is used and the question arises whether it indicates a period of occupation or a period agreed upon in a contract. To determine the right meaning we shall first analyse the provisions of the Act generally and then consider what is the true meaning of the two expressions in S. 9 on which there has been a difference of opinion between the High Court and the two courts below.;