- (1.) This appeal is brought, by special leave, against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, Dated November 2, 1962 Dismissing the writ petition No. 454 of 1955 filed by the appellant -Raja Anand Brahma Shah.
(2.) The appellant was the Zamindar of Pargana Agori lying to the south of Kaimur Range in the district of Mirzapur. On October 4, 1950, a notification was issued by the State Government under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act" ) stating that the area of 409.6 acres in the village of Markundi Ghurma Pargana Agori was needed for a public purpose. The purpose specified in the notification was "for limestone quarry". The notification provided that the case being one of urgency, the provisions o sub-s.(1) of S. 17 of the Act applied to the land and it was, therefore, directed under sub-s (4) of S. 17 that the provisions of S. 5A of the Act would not apply to the land. On December 12, 1950, a further notification was issued under S. 6 of the Act declaring that the Governor was satisfied that the land mentioned in the notification was needed for public purposes and directed the Collector of Mirazpur to take order for acquisition of the land under S. 7 of the Act. The Collector of Mirazpur was further directed by the notification under S. 17 (1) of the Act, the case being one of urgency, to take possession of any waste or arable land on the expiration of the notice mentioned in S. 9 (1) , though no award under S. 11 had been made. On November 19,1950, possession of the land was taken by the Collector of Mirazpur and the same was handed over to the Administrative Officer, Government Cement Factory, Churk. An award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer on January 7, 1952 stating that the amount of compensation was Rs. 23,638-13-7. The appellant thereafter filed an application under S. 18 of the Act for a reference to the Civil Court in regard to the amount of compensation payable. A reference to the Civil Court was accordingly made and the matter is still pending in the Civil Court as Land Acquisition Reference No. 4 of 1952. On May 2, 1955, the Writ Petition giving rise to this appeal was filed by the appellant in the Allahabad High Court. It is alleged by the appellant that the acquisition of the land was not for a public purpose and the acquisition proceedings were consequently without jurisdiction It was also stated that the State Government had no jurisdiction to apply the provisions of S. 17 (1) of the Act to the land in dispute as it was neither waste nor arable land. It was further claimed that the mines and minerals in the land belonged to the appellant and as such he was entitled to compensation for the same. The appellant accordingly prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the notifications of the State Government under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and further proceedings in pursuance of that notice in the land acquisitions case. The appellant also prayed that the State Government should be directed to pay compensation to the appellant for all the lime-stone removed from the land. By its judgment, dated November 2, 1962 the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, holding (1) that the petitioner was not the owner of mines and minerals and was not entitled to compensation for them (2) the' land had been acquired for a public purpose, and (3) that the provisions of S. 17 of the Act were applicable to the case and there was no illegality in the notifications of the State Government under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act.
(3.) The first question to be considered is whether the notification of the State Government under S. 4 of the Act, dated October 4, 1950 is liable to be quashed on the ground that the acquisition of the land was not for a public purpose. It was alleged for the appellant that the lime-stone extracted from quarries situated in the land was used by the State Government for the manufacture of cement which was sold for profit in open market and was not used for any public work of construction. It was contended that the manufacture of cement for being sold for profit will not amount to a public purpose and the notification of the State Government under S. 4 of the Act must therefore, be held to be illegal. In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. It is manifest that the declaration made by the State Government in the notification under S. 6 (1) of the Act, that the land was required for a public purpose, is made conclusive by sub-s. (3) of S. 6 and it is, therefore. not open to a Court to go behind it and try to satisfy itself whether in fact the acquisition was for a public purpose. It was pointed out by this Court in Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 774: (AIR 1963 SC 151), that it was for the Government to he satisfied, in a particular case, that the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose and the declaration of the Government under Section 6 ( 1) of the Act will be final subject, however, to one exception, namely in the case of colourable exercise of the power, the declaration is open to challenge at the in stance of the aggrieved party. The power conferred on the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where it is for a public purpose (leaving aside, for the moment, where the acquisition is for a company under Part VII of the (Act). If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all, the action of the Government would be colourable as being outside the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration under S.6 of the Act will be a nullity. On behalf of the respondents the argument was stressed that the lime-stone was utilised for being used in the cement factory established in the Public Sector at Churk. It was argued that the production of cement was important in national interest, particularly when the cement was used in the construction of the Rihand dam. It is conceded on behalf of the respondents that the allegation of the appellant that cement was being sold in market for profit was not clearly controverted by the counter-affidavit by the State but it was said that even on the assumption that the cement was sold for profit the use of the lime-stone in the production of the cement was in public interest, because the profit from the sale of cement benefited the General Revenues of the State. It is not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion as to whether the production of cement as a commercial enterprise is a public purpose within the meaning of the Act for we consider that the principle of the decision of this Court in (1963) 2 SCR 774: (AIR 1963 SC 151), applies to this case and the argument of the appellant must be rejected because he has not been able to show that the action of the Government in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act is a colourable exercise of power.;