Hedge, J. - (1.) IN these connected appeals by certificates the question that arises for decision is whether the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act of 1963 (Act No. XVI of 1963) is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. The Respondents in these appeals were entitled to receive cash grants from the Government of Madhya Pradesh. The impugned Act abolished such grants but provided for the payment of certain compensation to the grantees. The Respondents challenged the vires of the Act before the High, Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 21 and 22 of 1963, on various grounds. The High Court rejected all the contentions advanced on behalf of the Respondents, excepting one, namely, that the Act is ultra vires of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub -Article (5) thereof. After obtaining from the High Court certificates under Article 133(1)(c), the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed these appeals. The State is challenging the correctness of the decision of the High Court to the extent it went against it. The Respondents on their part, in addition to supporting the findings of the High Court which are in their favour, relied also on the other pleas taken by them before the High Court. As we are of the opinion that the impugned Act is either violative of Article 31(2) or in the alternative, Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, we have not thought it necessary to go into the other contentions taken on behalf of the Respondents.
(2.) BEFORE the impugned Act was enacted, the State of Madhya Bharat which forms part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, purported to abolish the cash grants payable by it by means of an executive order. That order was unsuccessfully challenged by Madhorao Phalke and Ors. before the High Court. But in appeal this Court in Madhorao Phalke Vs, State of Madhya Bharat : 1960 JLJ 1064 :, (1961) I SCR 967 quashed the order in question, holding that the grants in question, were recognised by the kalambandis of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Rulers of Gwalior and those kalambandis are existing laws within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution and consequently the same could not be abrogated by means of an executive order. It may be noted that in that appeal, the Appellant challenged the order in question on two grounds, namely -(1) that as his right to receive the cash grant had been statutorily recognised by the State of Gwalior, it was not open to the Government of Madhya Bharat to extinguish that right merely by an executive order, and (2) that that right being property the same could not be divested without payment of compensation under Article 31 of the Constitution. this Court allowed the appeal on the first ground and consequently it did not deal with the second. After the decision of this Court in that case, the impugned Act was enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature on April 5, 1963. It received the assent of the President on July 25, 1963 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette, Extraordinary on August 2, 1963. The Act comes into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint. Even before that notification was issued, the petitions from which these appeals arise were instituted in the High Court. We are given to understand that in view of those petitions, the Act has not yet been brought into force. The long title of the Act says that it is an Act to provide for the discontinuance of cash grants in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith. It contains twelve sections. Section 1 sets out the short title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 defines some of the expressions found in the Act. Section 3 is the most important section. It purports to abolish certain cash grants. Section 4 provides for statement of claims by the grantees. Section 5 provides the manner of determining the compensation payable. Section 6 prescribes that appeal, revision and review under the Act to be in accordance with Madhya Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1959. Section 7 provides for the determination of disputes as regards the title of any grantee. Section 8 bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts to issue an injunction against any person in respect of any proceedings pending before the competent authority under Section 5 which shall have the effect of staying the proceedings. Section 9 prescribes the quantum of compensation payable. Section 10 deals with the mode of payment of compensation . Section 11 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act. Section 12 says that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, the State Government may by order make such provisions not inconsistent with the purposes of this Act as appears to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty.
(3.) IN these appeals we are mainly concerned with the vires of Section 3 read with the definition of "cash grant" in Section 2 (1). If Section 3 read with Section 2 (1) is held to be ultra vires of the Constitution, then the whole Act falls to the ground as the remaining sections of the Act are merely subsidiary or incidental provisions. Section 5 (A) provides that not withstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage, sanad or a decree or order of a Court or other authority whatsoever, all cash grants shall be discontinued and cease to have effect from the commencement of this Act. But the proviso thereto makes certain exceptions with which we are not concerned in this case. The case of the Respondents fall within the main part. They do not have the benefit of the proviso. A cash grant as defined in Section 2 (1) (B) includes a grant of money which is enforceable by the grantee against the State Government on the date of the coming into force of the Act but does not include those grants which are specifically excluded. This definition takes in all the cash grants whatever may be the nature or origine of those grants. The definition of a cash grant is wide enough to include cash grants sanctioned by ex -Rulers in lieu of Jagirs or other properties resumed or even payments agreed to be made in lieu of loans given to the Rulers. Different considerations may arise if the grants abolished are gratuitous payments, grants in lieu of services to be rendered or other resumable grants. But as mentioned earlier, the definition of cash grants in Section 2 (1) does not make any distinction between the various types of cash grants. Hence, the said definition will have to stand or fall as a whole, there being no basis for severing some out of the several grants included therein. It is impermissible for this Court to re -write that clause and confine the definition only to such of the cash grants which the Legislature might be competent to abolish.;