Shelat, J. - (1.) This appeal by special leave is against the order of the High Court of Madras dated January 11, 1961 refusing the certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution.
(2.) The authorities appointed under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Madras Act II of 1927 having held that the premises No. 29 South Masi Street, Madurai wherein the idol of Sri Srinivasaparumal and certain other idols were located constituted a temple within the meaning of the said Act, the appellant filed an application in the District Court for a declaration that the said premises were private property and for an order setting aside the said decision. The said application was by an order of the High Court converted into a suit. The main question in the suit was whether the said premises could be said to be a temple as defined by Madras Act XIX of 1951. The District Judge, Madurai, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant holding that the aforesaid premises did not constitute a temple and set aside the decision of the said authorities. On appeal, the High Court reversed the said judgment and decree and found that the premises in question constituted a temple. The appellant thereupon fled a petition for leave to appeal to this Court and submitted that the value of the subject-matter of dispute in the District Court as also in appeal in the High Court was more than Rs. 20,000 and that the judgment of the High Court having reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court he was entitled to leave under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b). The High Court dismissed that application on the following grounds:(a) that the subject-matter of the dispute, whether it was a private or a public temple could have no market value and, therefore, was incapable of valuation. (b) that Cl. (b) of Art. 133 (1) could not apply as the judgment and decree passed by it did not involve directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000 or more, and (c) that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law.
(3.) For the time being we are concerned with grounds (a) and (b) and not with ground (c) as the contention raised by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer for the appellant was that the refusal to grant leave by the High Court under either of the clauses (a) and (b) of Art. 133 (1) was not correct;