- (1.) The petitioner, Puran Lal Lakhanpal was arrested and detained under Cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules 1962 by an order passed on December 10 1965 and directed to be detained in Central Jail Tehar, New Delhi. The order stated that : "Whereas the Central Government is satisfied that with a view to preventing Shri P. L. Lakhanpal, son of late Shri Diwan Chand Sharma, ................from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary that he should be detained; Now, therefore, ..................... the Central Government hereby directs that the said Shri. P. L. Lakhanpal be detained." He has moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution by a petition presented on December 24, 1965 for a writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release. He challenges the legality of the detention order on various grounds which we now proceed to consider.
(2.) The first ground is that R. 30 (1) (b) is ultra vires S. 3 (2) (15) (i) of the Defence of India Act under which the Rules were made. Sub-s. (1) of S. 3 contains the general power to make rules for certain purposes. Sub-s. (2) states that the rules made may provide for and may empower any authority to make orders providing for all or any of the following matters, namely :- X X X X X X X X "(15) notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force,- (i) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered.... suspects, on grounds appearing to that authority to be reasonable ......acting, being about to act or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the security of the State, the public safety or interest, the maintenance of public order, ..... or with respect to whom that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him from acting in any such prejudicial manner." Rule 30 (1) (b) is in these terms : "The Central Government . . . if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, may make an order (a) X X X (b) directing that he be detained." It will be noticed that the rule does not say that the satisfaction mentioned in it shall be on grounds appearing to the authority concerned to be reasonable. It is said that by omitting these words the rule has gone outside the section which mentions them, and is, therefore ultra vires. This contention is untenable. It overlooks the fact that the latter part of the section states that the rules made under it may also provide for the apprehension and detention of a person "with respect to whom that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary" for certain purposes; this part does not contain any requirement as to satisfaction on reasonable grounds. This part of the section is independent of the earlier part under which the apprehension and detention can be directed only when the authority suspects on certain grounds appearing to it to be reasonable that a person is about to act in a certain manner. It is of some significance to point out that the second part of the section is preceded by the word 'or'. That puts it beyond doubt that the rules made under it may provide for detention in two alternative cases, for the first of which only it is necessary that the authority should entertain a suspicion on grounds appearing to it to be reasonable. That requirement is absent in the case of a rule made under the second part of the section. Rule 30 (1) (b) cannot be said to be ultra vires the section for the reason that it does not state that the satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention has to be on grounds appearing to it to be reasonable. The rule requires only that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the detention is necessary for the purposes mentioned and that is what the latter part of the section under which it was made also says. The rule has clearly been made in terms of the section authorising it.
(3.) It was next said that the Proclamation of Emergency made by the President under Art. 352 of the Constitution which prevented the Act from being illegal, was not in terms of the article, as it did not state that the President was satisfied that a grave emergency existed. It is true that the Proclamation did not do that. It stated : "In exercise of the powers conferred by Cl. (1) of Art. 352 of the Constitution, I, Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, President of India, by this Proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by external aggression." We, however, find nothing in the Article which requires the Proclamation to state the satisfaction of the President about the emergency. Article 352 (1) reads, "If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by proclamation, make a declaration to that effect." The Article requires only a declaration of emergency threatening the security of India by one of the causes mentioned. The words to that effect" can have no other meaning. The power to make the declaration can no doubt be exercised only when the President is satisfied about the emergency, but we do not see that the Article requires the condition precedent for the exercise of the power, that is, the President's satisfaction, to be stated in the declaration. The declaration shows that the President must have satisfied himself about the existence of the emergency for in these matters the rule that official acts are presumed to have been properly performed applies and there is nothing proved by the petitioner to displace that presumption. We were referred to certain other provisions, viz., Art. 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution and R. 30 (1) (b) of the Rules and it was contended that these provisions require the satisfaction to be stated. It is unnecessary to decide whether they so require. Even if they did, the requirement of the statement of the President's satisfaction in the present case has to be decided on the terms of Art. 352 alone. We have said that this Article does not contain any such requirement. It is of interest to point out here that the petitioner stated in his petition that he extended his full support to the Government on the Proclamation of Emergency. Obviously he could not have done so if he had any doubt about the legality of the Proclamation. Then it was said that the Proclamation should have stated the direction from which the external aggression which it mentioned was apprehended. We find nothing in the Article to require the Proclamation to state this. The Proclamation was issued on October 26, 1962 when, it is well known. India's integrity was threatened by China.;