MOHD MURTIYA KHAN Vs. STATE OF M P
LAWS(SC)-1966-3-46
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: ALLAHABAD)
Decided on March 23,1966

MOHD.MURTIZA KUAN Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

SUBBA RAO, J. - (1.) THE appellant, Mohd. Murtiza Khan, is the son of Mohd. Ahmad Khan. In respect of 108.51 acres of lands situate in village Chandpur Tahsil Gairatganj, in the State of Madhya Pradesh, pattas were issued in favour of the appellant in 1944 and 1947. In September 1951 pursuant to a settlement alleged to have been entered into between the appellant's father, Mohd. Ahmad Khan, and respondents 2 to 8, the Collector of Raisen cancelled the Pattas of the appellant and the said lands were put in the possession of respondents 2 to 8. THE appeal filed by the appellant to the Revenue Commissioner was dismissed on March 28, 1952. THE appellant became major on March 15, 1953. On April 22, 1954, he filed Suit No. 21 of 1954 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Begamganj, for a declaration of title in his favour in respect of the said property, for cancellation of the Pattas issued by the Collector on October 22, 1951, in favour of the respondents and for possession thereof. It was alleged in the plaint, inter alia, that the alleged compromise between the appellant's father and the respondents was brought about by coersion and that the order cancelling the Pattas was illegal. THE contesting respondents alleged that they were the tenants of the said lands before the alleged Pattas were issued in favour of the appellant by a fraud practised by his father, that the subsequent settlement between appellant's father and the respondents was bona fide one, and that the order of the Collector setting aside the previous order issuing Pattas in favour of the appellant was valid.
(2.) ON the said pleadings as many as 12 issues were framed. The first seven issues related to limitation, court-fee and other technical grounds. Issues 8 to 12 related to merits. The trial Court by its judgment dated April 12, 1958 answered issues 1 to 7 in favour of the appellant, but answered the remaining issues against him. In the result it dismissed the appellant's suit. On appeal, the learned District Judge, Bhopal, held that the appellant's father was not guilty of fraud in obtaining the Pattas in the name of the appellant, and that the order of the Collector cancelling the previous Pattas was illegal. On the said view, he decreed the suit in favour of the appellant. It does not appear from the judgment of the District Judge that any argument was made by the respondents before him on the question of limitation. On a further appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, set aside the decree of the District Judge on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 14 of the Limitation Act. Hence the appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Article of the Limitation Act appropriate to the suit is Article 142 and not Article 14 there of. Elaborating this contention it is argued that the Collector had no jurisdiction to review the order issuing Pattas in favour of the appellant and that, therefore, the said order could be ignored, with the result that the plaintiff-appellant, on the basis of his title, would be entitled to a decree for possession, as the suit was filed within three years from the date he attained majority. Article 142 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation of 12 years for a suit for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff has been dispossessed from the date of dispossession. The appellant filed the suit on the basis of his title for possession alleging that he was dispossessed. To such a suit Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies.
(3.) BUT it is said that in view of the order of the Collector setting aside the previous order issuing Pattas in favour of the appellant, Article 14 of the Limitation Act is attracted. Article 14 of the said Act reads: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run To set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity, not herein otherwise expressly provided for. One year The date of the act or order If this Article applies, the suit is admittedly barred. The opening words of Article 14 indicate that unless it is necessary to set aside an order before a further relief can be obtained, this Article has no application. If an order is without jurisdiction, it need not be set aside. The question, therefore, is whether the order of the Collector cancelling the Pattas issued in favour of the appellant was an order made without jurisdiction. On September 29, 1951, the Collector after receiving the report from the Tahsildar, cancelled the previous Pattas issued in favour of the appellant and directed allotment of the same to the respondents. The revision filed by the appellant to the Revenue Commissioner was dismissed on March 28, 1952. Ex-facie there is nothing on the record to show that the Collector in cancelling the previous order took the permission of the Government. We proceed, therefore, on the assumption that the Collector set aside the previous order without the permission of the Government. The only section that has been brought to our notice which empowers the Collector to review his previous order is section 34 of the Bhopal State Land Revenue Act, 1932 (Act IV of 1932), hereinafter called the Act. The relevant part of that section reads: "Every revenue officer may, either on his own motion or on the application of any party interested, review any order passed by himself and pass such order in reference thereto as be thinks fit: Provided that- (iii) an order passed by his predecessor shall not be reviewed by the .. Nazim without the previous permission of the Government.." ;


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