- (1.) A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Lilawati Agarwal (Dead) By Lrs. and Others vs. State of Jharkhand, 2008 15 SCC 464 after referring to the paragraphs 31 and 34 of the pronouncement in Union of India and Another vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc., 1989 2 SCC 754 , expressed doubt with regard to the correctness of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan (II) vs. State of Kerala and Others, 1995 1 SCC 367 and eventually expressed thus:- "In Raghubir Singh case two terminus points were fixed i.e. award by the Collector or decision of the Reference Court must have been taken between 3-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. It has been clearly stated in the last line of para 34 that every case "must" have been decided between the aforesaid terminus. In Paripoornan II case at para 4 it was observed that restrictive interpretation should not be given. With great respect we are unable to subscribe to the view. As a matter of fact a three-Judge Bench was trying to give an interpretation different from what was specifically given by the Constitution Bench. Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench to consider correctness of the view expressed in para 4 in Paripoornan II case holding that a restricted interpretation should not be given, on the face of what has been stated in para 34 of Raghubir Singh case. Records may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for necessary details." On the basis of the aforesaid order, the matter has been placed before us.
(2.) As we perceive, it is necessary to express an opinion whether the correctness of the decision in K.S. Paripoornan (II) deserves to be considered by a Constitution Bench as the pronouncement in the said case is binding on us.
(3.) To appreciate the controversy, we think it appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 from Raghubir Singh :- "30. We now come to the merits of the reference. The reference is limited to the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Before the enactment of the Amendment Act, solatium was provided under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (shortly, "the parent Act") at 15% on the market value of the Land computed in accordance with Section 23(1) of the Act, the solatium being provided in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on 30 April, 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation with effect from 24 September, 1984. Section 15 of the Amendment Act amended Section 23(2) of the parent Act and substituted the words '30 per centum' in place of the words '15 per centum'. Parliament intended that the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before that date. It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting Section 30(2) in the Amendment Act, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act provides: "(2) the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 23......of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15........of this Act ....... shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act." 31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April 1982 and .24 September 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982. xxxxx xxxxx 34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, 1986 1 SCC 365, but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision. It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh, 1985 3 SCC 737 , but the judgment in Bhag Singh, as we have said earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under-Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out that the word 'or' has been used in Section 30(2), as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word 'or' is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under-Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.";