DIPAK MISRA, J. - (1.) This batch of writ petitions preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India exposits cavil in its quintessential conceptuality and percipient discord between venerated and exalted right of freedom of speech and expression of an individual, exploring manifold and multilayered, limitless, unbounded and unfettered spectrums, and the controls, restrictions and constrictions, under the assumed power of "reasonableness" ingrained in the statutory provisions relating to criminal law to reviver and uphold one's reputation. The assertion by the Union of India and the complainants is that the reasonable restrictions are based on the paradigms and parameters of the Constitution that are structured and pedestaled on the doctrine of non -absoluteness of any fundamental right, cultural and social ethos, need and feel of the time, for every right engulfs and incorporates duty to respect other's right and ensure mutual compatibility and conviviality of the individuals based on collective harmony and conceptual grace of eventual social order; and the asseveration on the part of the petitioners is that freedom of thought and expression cannot be scuttled or abridged on the threat of criminal prosecution and made paraplegic on the mercurial stance of individual reputation and of societal harmony, for the said aspects are to be treated as things of the past, a symbol of colonial era where the ruler ruled over the subjects and vanquished concepts of resistance; and, in any case, the individual grievances pertaining to reputation can be agitated in civil courts and thus, there is a remedy and viewed from a prismatic perspective, there is no justification to keep the provision of defamation in criminal law alive as it creates a concavity and unreasonable restriction in individual freedom and further progressively mars voice of criticism and dissent which are necessitous for the growth of genuine advancement and a matured democracy.
(2.) The structural architecture of these writ petitions has a history, although not in any remote past, but, in the recent times. In this batch of writ petitions, we are required to dwell upon the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC') and Sections 199(1) to 199(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "CrPC"). It is necessary to note here that when the Writ Petition (Crl) No. 184 of 2014 was taken up for consideration, Dr. Subramanian Swamy, the petitioner appearing in -person, had drawn our attention to paragraph 28 of the decision in R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and another v. State of T.N. and others (1994) 6 SCC 632 which reads as follows: - "In all this discussion, we may clarify, we have not gone into the impact of Article 19(1)(a) read with clause (2) thereof on Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code. That may have to await a proper case."
(3.) Dr. Swamy had also drawn our attention to the observations made in N. Ravi and others v. Union of India and others (2007) 15 SCC 631, which are to the following effect: - "Strictly speaking on withdrawal of the complaints, the prayer about the validity of Section 499 has also become academic, but having regard to the importance of the question, we are of the view, in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the validity aspect deserves to be examined. In this view, we issue rule, insofar as prayer (a) is concerned." ;