S.C. Agrawal, J. - (1.) Leave granted.
(2.) This appeal by the tenant arises out of a suit for eviction filed by the respondents under the provision of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It relates to a shop situated at Udaipur in Rajasthan. Under Section 13(l) (a) of the Act, the tenant can be evicted from the premises if he has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months, Sub-section (6) of Section 13 affords protection to the tenant from eviction if the tenant deposits in Court or pays to the landlord the amount determined by the Court in terms of sub-sections(3) and (4) of Section 13 of the Act. This protection is however, not available if the tenant after having obtained such benefit in respect of the premises again makes fault in the payment of rent of the said premises for six months. The respondent landlords had filed a suit (Suit No. 117 of 1981) against the appellant for his eviction on the ground of default in the payment of rent and protection under Section 13(6) of the Act was given to the appellant in those proceedings. On December 20, 1982 the respondents filed a second suit (Suit No. 169 of 1983) which has given rise to this appeal in the Court of District Judge at Udaipur for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he has defaulted for the second time in payment of rent inasmuch as he had not paid the rent for six months from May 1, 1982. The said suit as contested by the appellant, who denied that he had committed a second default in payment of rent for six months. The case of the appellant was that he had paid the rent for five months from May, 1982 to September, 1982 in cash to the respondent and 10 days later on October 21, 1982 when he went to them for collecting the receipt for the said payment, they refused to give the said receipt and returned the amount which was paid by the appellant to the respondents by way of rent. The appellant claims that thereupon on Section 19-A of the Act in the Court of Munsiff(South), Udaipur narrating the aforesaid facts and seeking permission of the Court to deposit the rent for the months of May to October, 1982 in the Court and the after obtaining the permission of the Court the appellant on October 29, 1982 deposited the sum of Rs. 3,600/- in the Court by way of rent for the period from May, 1982 to October, 1982 by tender No. 1711 dated October 29,1982 and that the notice of application submitted by the appellant under Section 19-A of the Act had been issued to the respondents. The said suit of the respondents was dismissed by the Additional District Judge No 1. Udaipur by his judgment dated July 2, 1987 on the view that the appellant could not be held to be a defaulter in the payment of rent since he had deposited the rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982 in the Court on 29th October, 1982 before the rent for six months fell due. The respondents filed an appeal against the said judgment of the Addl. District Judge in the High Court of Rajasthan. The said appeal was allowed by a learned single Judge of the High Court by his judgment dated January 25, 1989. The learned Judge, after considering the evidence adduced by the appellant, has held that his plea about payment of rent personally to the respondent had no legs to stand. The learned Judge further held that the deposit by the appellant in the Court under Section 19-A of the Act was not a valid deposit and the appellant could not claim any benefit on the basis of the said deposit under Section 19-A inasmuch as the appellant have not adopted the procedure as laid down in sub-section (3) of Section 19-A before making the said deposit and that the appellant had committed a second default in payment of rent for six months. The learned single Judge rejected the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the cause of action had not arisen on November 1, 1982 because the rent for the month of October could have been paid by November 15 and that on November 1, 1982 the rent for five months only was due and not for six months. The learned single Judge has held that the rent for a particular month becomes due as soon as the month ends and under the provisions of the Act it was made payable by a particular date. i.e. the 15th of next following month, but it was only a facility provided to the tenant to pay the rent by that date and it does not mean that the rent for the month of October had not become due on November 1, 1982. The special appeal filed by the appellant against the said judgment of the learned single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated March 8, 1989. Hence, this appeal.
(3.) Shri Rajinder Sachar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has, in the first place, invited our attention to para 6 of the plaint, wherein the respondents have stated: "6 That the cause of action for the suit arose on 1-11-1982 when the rent of six months became outstanding." The submission of Shri Sachar is that in view of Clause (e) of Rule 1 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent upon the respondents to set out in the plaint the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose and as per the said requirement the respondents, in para 6 of the plaint, have indicated that the cause of action arose on November 1, 1982. Shri Sachar has submitted that the said statement in para 6 of the plaint is not correct and has pointed out that under sub-section (1) of Section 19-A of the Act, it is provided:- "(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable." According to Shri Sachar since no time was fixed for payment of rent by contract, the rent was payable by the appellant by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it was payable and the rent for the month of October, 1982 was therefore payable by November 15, 1982 and that on November 1, 1982 the rent for October, 1982 was not due and therefore, it could not be said that on November 1, 1982, when the cause of action is claimed to have arisen, the appellant was in default of payment of rent for six months. It is no doubt true that in view of sub-section (1) of Section 19-A of the Act, since there was no contract prescribing the date for payment of rent, the appellant could pay the rent for the month of October, 1982 till November 15,1982 and the cause of action for filing a suit on the ground of default for the payment of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982 could arise only on November 16, 1982 and to that extent and the statement in the plaint that the cause of action arose on November 1, 1982 is not correct. But that does not mean that the respondent must be non-suited on this ground. The object underlying Order VII Rule (1) (e) which requires that the plaint shall contain the particulars about the Acts constituting the cause of action and when it arose, is to enable the Court to find out whether the plaint discloses the cause of action because the plaint is luable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 C. P. C. if it does not disclose the cause of action. The purpose behind the requirement that the plaint should indicate when the cause of action arose is to help the Court in ascertaining whether the suit is not barred by limitation. Any error on the part of the plaintiff in indicating the date on which the cause of action arose would be of little consequence if the cause of action had arisen on the date on which the suit was within limitation feom the said date. The error in mentioning the date on which the cause of action had arisen in the plaint in such a case would not disentitle the plaintiff from seeking relief from the Court in the suit. In the instant case, the suit was filed on December 20, 1982 on which date admittedly the rent for six month i.e. from May, 1982 to October, 1982 had fallen due. Moreover, in para 7 of the plaint, while indicating the valuation of the suit for the purpose of Court fee, the respondents have stated that there was out standing rent of 7 month amounting to Rs. 4,200/- and Court-fee was paid on the said amount of outstanding rent. Merely because in para 6 of the plaint, the respondents have stated that the cause of action arose on November 1, 1982 would not, in our opinion, disentitle the respondents from seeking relief of eviction since as per the plaint, on the date of the filing of the suit the rent for seven months (May, 1982 to November, 1982) has fallen due. The first contention urged by Shri Sachar cannot, therefore be accepted.;