- (1.) Leave granted. These four appeals are directed against a common judgment dated 19th October, 1987 delivered by the High Court in four writ petitions filed before it by four appellants. Since the questions of law which arise in these appeals are common, it would be sufficient to refer to the facts in one of the appeals, viz., Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. No. 3204 of 1988 since the High Court has taken the facts from it.
(2.) In 1920, Government of India being anxious to develop the undeveloped lands throughout the country including that in the district of Nainital offered to extend many concessions to those who agreed to develop the land. Lala Khush Ram Dusaj, predescessor of the appellant was one of the persons who accepted the offer and agreed to develop land in District Nainital. Government of India granted lease of 4805 acres of land to Lala Khushi Ram for development under the Grants Act [later renamed as Government Grants Act. 1895 - hereinafter referred to as "the Grants Act"] by a registered lease deed dated 25-8-1920 which was executed by the Secretary of State of India in Council for a period extending up to 31st March, 2013. One of the conditions of the said lease with which we are concerned here, was that the leased land would not be taken away except as specified by the clauses of the lease deed and that too for the purpose of land reforms. In case the land was taken away, compensation was payable to the lessee in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 3, of the Grants Act provided that all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such grant or transfer shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature to the contrary notwithstanding. After taking possession of the leased land, the lessee Lala Khushi Ram is alleged to have spent moneys to clear the jungle and level the uneven terrain and develop the land for agriculture. In the year 1959, the State of U.P. passed U.P. Government Estates Thekedari Abolition Act, 1958 [hereinafter referrred to as the "Principal Act"] and issued notifications under the said Act for taking over the leased lands granted under the Grants Act and issued notifications vesting all such lands in the State. In 1960, the State of U.P. amended the Grants Act. While retaining the provisions of section 3, of the said Act the amendment added a proviso to the said section which stated that nothing in the said section shall prevent, or be deemed ever to have prevented, the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural land.
(3.) By its decision dated 25th October, 1967 the High Court declared the provision of the Principal Act as ultra vires the Constitution and quashed the notifications issued under the said Act, taking over the land leased under the Grants Act. In 1970, the State of U.P. passed the Uttar Pradesh Government Estates Thekedari Abolition [Re-enactment and Validation] Act, 1970 [for short 'the Validation Act] with the result that the Principal Act and the notifications which had been issued thereunder were revived by adding a deeming clause. Under the amended Principal Act, the State issued notifications on 16th October, 1970 applying the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 [for short 'the Z.A. Act] to the villages in question. In the year 1973, the appellant who is the successor of Lala Khushi Ram, the original lessee, received notices under the amended Principal Act and also received copies of compensation roll showing the compensation at less than Rs. 3/- per acre. The appellant, therefore, filed his objection before the Collector who referred the matter to the respondent No. 1-Additional District Judge. On 17th December, 1977, respondent No. 1 partly accepted the reference. The appellant, therefore, moved the High Court by a writ petition. On 19th October, 1987 the High Court dismissed all the writ petitions before it by the impugned common judgment. Hence the present appeals.;