M. K. Mukherjee, J. - (1.) Special leave granted. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
(2.) These two appeals have been heard together as they arise out of one and the same incident. Facts leading to these appeals and relevant for their disposal are as under: On July 29, 1988, Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an Officer of the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.) belonging to the Punjab Cadre and then working as the Special Secretary, Finance, lodged a complaint with the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh Union Territory alleging commission of offences under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short) by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of Police, Punjab on July 18, 1988 at a dinner party. Treating that complaint as the First Information Report (FIR) a case was registered by the Central Police Station, Sector 17, Chandigarh and investigation was taken up. Thereafter on November 22, 1988, her husband Mr. B.R. Bajaj, who also happens to be a senior I.A.S. Officer of the Punjab Cadre, lodged a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate for the same offences, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Gill being a high ranking Police Officer the Chandigarh Police had neither arrested him in connection with the case registered by the Police on his wife's complaint nor conducted investigation in a fair and impartial manner and apprehending that the Police would conclude the investigation by treating the case was untraced he was filing the complaint. On receipt of the complaint the Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred it to a Judicial Magistrate for disposal and the latter, in view of the fact that an investigation by the Police was in progress in relation to the same offences, called for a report from the investigating Officer in accordance with Section 210 of Code of Criminal Procedure ("Cr. P.C." for short). In the meantime - on December 16, 1988 to be precise - Mr. Gill moved the High Court by filing a petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing the FIR and the complaint. On that petition an interim order was passed staying the investigation into the FIR lodged Mrs. Bajaj, but not the proceedings initiated on the complaint of Mr. Bajaj. Resultantly, the learned Judicial Magistrate proceeded with the complaint case and examined the complainant and the witnesses produced by him. Thereafter, Mr. Bajaj moved an application before the learned Magistrate for summoning Mr. Y.S. Ratra, an I.A.S. Officer of the Government of Punjab and Mr. J. F. Rebeiro. Adviser to the Governor of Punjab for being examined as witnesses on his behalf and for producing certain documents, which was allowed. Instead of appearing personally, the above two Officers sought for exemption from appearance; and the District Attorney, after producing the documents, filed an application claiming privilege under Sections 123/124 of the Evidence Act in respect of them. The learned Magistrate rejected the prayer of the above two officers and also rejected, after going through the documents, the claim of privilege, being of the opinion that the documents did not concern the affairs of the State. Assailing the order of the learned Magistrate rejecting the claim of privilege, the State of Punjab filed a Criminal Revision Petition which was allowed by the High Court by its Order dated January 24, 1989. The petition earlier filed by Mr. Gill under Section 482, Cr. P.C., came up for hearing before the High Court thereafter and was allowed by its order dated May 29, 1989 and both the FIR and the complaint were quashed. The above two orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals at the instance of Mr. and Mrs. Bajaj. Of the two appeals we first proceed to consider the merits of the one preferred against quashing of the FIR and the complaint (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2358 of 1989) for, in case it fails, the other appeal (arising out of S.L.P. (Cri) No.1361 of 1989) would, necessarily, be infructuous.
(3.) On perusal of the impugned judgment we find that the following reasons weighed with the High Court in quashing the FIR:- (i) the allegations made therein do not disclose any cognizable offence; (ii) the nature of harm allegedly caused to Mrs. Bajaj did not entitle her to complain about the same in view of Section 95, IPC; (iii) the allegations are unnatural and improbable; (iv) the Investigation Officer did not apply his mind to the allegations made in the FIR, for had he done so, he would have found that there was no reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence, which was the 'sine qua non' for starting an investigation under Section 157, Cr. P.C. ; and (v) there was unreasonable and unexplained delay of 11 days in lodging the FIR ;