DESAI, J. - (1.) THE Judgment of the court was delivered by -
(2.) AS the matter brooked no delay, when the arguments were concluded, the Court pronounced the order which reads as under : The appeal is allowed and the decision of the High court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P.A. No. 1232 of 1982 dated 15/09/1982 as well as the decision of the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 2321 of 1981 dated 30/08/1982. The writ petition filed by the present appellant succeeds. The Order of the Director of Industries dated 25/05/1981 granting a quarry lease to M/s Pioneer Crushing Co. (respondent 4) in respect of Serai Khawaja Plot No. II Quarry (except the area of Green Field colonies) for the period ending with 31/03/1984 is quashed and set aside. The first respondent the State of Haryana and the second respondent the Director of Industries are directed under and subject to the relevant provisions of the Haryana Minor Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 read with Punjab Minor and Mineral Concession Rules, 1964 as applicable to the State of 271 Haryana to grant a right to the appellant in the form of contract usually entered into in similar cases to extract stones from Serai Khawaja Plot No. II on compensation howsoever described at the rate of Rs. 25 lacs per year for a period of five years commencing from 1/01/1983 and up to and inclusive and ending with 31/12/1987. The appellant herein is directed to appear before the second respondent within a week from today to execute the contract and/or necessary' documents, instruments and to carry out all formalities including the making of deposits and/or payments, if any, required to be made under the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. The fourth respondent is given time up to 31/12/1982 to clear out from the area and this time is given to him as and by way of locus penitent to wind up his affairs as far as the quarry involved in this appeal. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Reasons will follow. Here are the reasons. It must be confessed that reasons in support of the decision are delayed but without offering an alibi for the tardiness, one aspect which inhibited giving of the reasons may be mentioned. My learned colleague suddenly left the court and the doubt nagged me for some time whether one Judge alone can give the reasons. It was an agreed order. Before pronouncing the order broad discussion took place which showed identity of views on all points involved in the matter. In this background to give reasons which appealed to us though drawn up by one of us would any day provide a better choice than not to give reasons because it would always annoy and distress the party who lost the legal battle whether there are legal or logical reasons in support of the order or it is merely an arbitrary exercise of power. However, what happened in the court in the presence of all parties and the learned counsel is res ipsa loquitur. What started before the Court as a minor whisper, hardly audible, ended with the experience in a whispering gallery where the whisper multiplied at the other end of the gallery in volleying thunders. There would have been no qualms of conscience if the matter was disposed of sub-silentio as to reasons because of the outcome of the court's exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136. The reasons which dictated the choice and indicated the path did stand in need of justification because the end product justified interference. The very outcome would provide the raison d'etre for the exercise of power. Yet to bow to the tradition to convince the protagonists of reasoned orders, these are the reasons. 272 Factual matrix first. The State of Haryana in exercise of the power conferred upon it by Haryana Minor Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 (1973 Act' for short) grants lease for winning minor mineral vesting in it. The grant of the lease is regulated by Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964 ('Rules' for short) in their application to the State of Haryana. A notification was issued on 26/12/1980 specifying that minor mineral quarries at various places in Faridabad District would be auctioned on 20/02/1981. At the auction held on that day, appellant - Ram and Shyam Company gave the highest bid for Sarai Khawaja Plot No. II in the amount of Rs. 1,52,000.00 p.a. The Presiding Officer conducting the auction accepted the bid but the State government did not confirm the same. A fresh auction was notified to be held on 4/05/1981. The appellant participated and gave the bid for the same plot, his highest bid rising to Rs. 3,87,000.00 for a period of three years. The same routine followed. The Presiding Officer accepted the bid and the State government declined to confirm the same. Then there happened something which cannot have any parallel or precedent in a constitutional democracy like ours but one could have profitably drawn parallel from the administration of old princely States. Respondent 4 wrote a letter dated 9/05/1981 (Anx. R-1 in the High. court) addressed to the Chief Minister, Haryana State setting out therein the history of various auctions, and casting serious aspersions on those who participated in the auction inter alia saying that the bidders at the auctions have formed a syndicate and want to monopolise the business by not outbidding each other so that the State gets uneconomical rent/royalty. It was further alleged that "the goondas and anti-social elements are assisting those monopolists/bidders and successfully pushed out a party like respondent 4". The letter further proceeds to make n offer that if the contract for a period of five years is given to respondent 4 in respect of Sarai Khawaja Plot No. 11, it is willing to pay Rs. 4.50,000.00 per year. There is also an offer for Sarai Khawaja Plot No. 1 with which we are not concerned. Promptly this offer was accepted by the Chief Minister. The appellant challenged the action of the Chief Minister in Writ Petition No. 2321 of 1981 in the Punjab and Haryana High court inter alia contending that those who formed the firm styled as M/s Pioneer Crushing Co./respondent 4, had participated in the auction and then made false allegations against the appellant whose bid was the highest and without giving him any opportunity, the offer of respondent 4 was accepted which has denied equality of opportunity to the appellant in the matter of distribution of State largesse.
(3.) A learned Single Judge issued a notice to the respondents calling upon them to show cause why rule nisi may not be issued. 273 In response to the notice, respondent 4 appeared and contended that the petitioner had an alternative remedy and on this short ground, the learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition. A division bench of the High court in the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant concurred with the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeal. Hence this. appeal by special leave. At this stage it would be advantageous to refer in some details what transpired at the hearing of this appeal in this court. Let us at once recapitulate what happened in the court because that by itself provides a tell-tale piece of evidence compelling the court to interfere and set aside the impugned order. Mr L.N. Sinha, learned Attorney-General raised a sort of a preliminary objection that this court should not assist the syndicalists to join hands to deprive the State of its legitimate revenue. Then he made a pertinent observation interposing an objection when Mr Sorabjee, learned counsel for the petitioner was making his submissions. The question posed was: if the court interferes and quashes the grant in favour of the fourth respondent, the only option open to the court would be to direct a fresh auction. He posed the further question that if at the time of reauction, the highest bid does not reach upto Rs 4,50,000.00 p.a. for which the lease is granted to the fourth respondent, would the court make good the loss? Apart from the rhetoric of the question, the issue raised was of primary importance. We therefore asked Mr Sorabjee whether his client is willing to make an affidavit incorporating therein that if the highest bid at a reauction, if the court so directs, falls short of Rs. 4,50,000, the appellant would agree and undertake to accept the contract at the value of Rs. 5,50,000.00 p.a. Such an affidavit was immediately filed. In order to give the fourth respondent to whom contract under the impugned order was given, an opportunity whether he would like to raise his offer, Mr P.P. Rao voiced his apprehension about his contentions. We assured him that without prejudice to his contentions, it would be open to his client to raise his offer. What transpired may be tabulated in a chart: JUDGEMENT_267_3_1985Html1.htm ;