Beg, J. - (1.) This application purporting to be for review of judgment and/or for clarification and/or expunging of the observations from the judgment has been filed under Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules which indicates the inherent powers of this Court.
(2.) The body of the petition as well as the prayers made show that the applicant has no grievance against the common conclusions of the five learned Judges of this Court, including myself, who delivered five separate judgments in the election Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 and the cross appeal No. 909 of 1975, the first by Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi and the second by Shri Raj Narain, who were candidates at an election held in Rae Bareli constituency in Uttar Pradesh in the first week of March, 1971. This petition of the election petitioner sets out the issues framed in the Trial Court. It then states facts showing that the 39th Amendment of the Constitution as well as some amendments by the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1975, were made before the above-mentioned appeals, filed under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against the same judgment, were taken up for hearing by this Court. Thereafter, the petition gives an account of the hearing of the appeals by this Court in the course of which, after hearing arguments on the constitutional amendment, his Lordship the Chief Justice, speaking for this Court, directed the parties to address their arguments on merits as well, as is admitted in paragraph 12 of the petition. The petitioner states that, as one of the learned Judges, Honble Mr. Justice Mathew, indicated, while Mr. A. K. Sen was arguing the appeal No. 887 of 1975 on merits and dealing with facts, that arguments should first be heard on the amendment of the election laws, and, after that, as Honble Mr. Justice Khanna also indicated that arguments on the amendment of election laws should be heard first, the Counsel for the election petitioner understood that he would have to confine his arguments to the validly of these amendments. The petition before us also contains statements showing that, so far as I was concerned, I had indicated to the parties that I regarded consideration of the merits of the case also to be essential for a just and proper decision and disposal of the appeals. Indeed, the direction given by His Lordship the Chief Justice to the parties to address their arguments on merits, after those on the constitutional amendment, necessarily meant, I think, that a consideration of merits could not be separated from questions of validity of the amendments of the election laws.
(3.) My own recollection of the hearing of the case is that merits, including broad questions of fact, were sufficiently gone into to enable us to deal with all questions of law emerging out of findings of fact given by the learned Judge and that questions were also put by me to learned Counsel for the election petitioner asking him to justify findings of fact on the only two questions on merits arising for consideration in Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975. Indeed, it appeared to me that questions of fact and law were very much intertwined. It was for this reason, amongst others, that I had repeatedly tried to draw the attention of Counsel, during the hearing, to these intertwined questions of law and fact with a view to getting their assistance and points of view on these questions.;