Sarkar, J. - (1.) THE respondents are the owners of certain premises in Connaught Circus in New Delhi, which were let out to Allen Berry & Co. (Calcutta) Ltd. Sometime in 1959 Allen Berry & Co. transferred the lease to the appellant and put the latter in possession. Alleging that the transfer had been made without their consent, the respondents made an application under Clause (b) of the proviso to sub -s. (1) of s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to the Controller appointed under it against Allen Berry & Co. and the appellant for an order for recovery of possession of the premises from them. While the application was pending, Allen Berry & Co. went into liquidation and was in due course dissolved and its name was, thereupon, struck off from the records of the proceedings. The Controller later heard the application and made an order in favour of the respondents for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant alone. An appeal by the appellant to the Rent Control Tribunal under the Act against this order was dismissed. The appellant then moved the High Court of Punjab for setting aside the order of the Tribunal, but there also it was unsuccessful. It has now come to this Court in further appeal.
(2.) IT was contended that the order for recovery of possession made against the appellant after Allen Berry & Co. had ceased to be a party to the proceedings, was incompetent. This contention was based on an interpretation of the terms of sub -s. (1) of s. 14, the material part of which is set out below : S. 14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant : Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, made an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : - (a)... ... ... (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub -let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; The contention of the appellant was put in this way : The first part of sub -s. (1) of s. 14 puts a complete ban on recovery of possession from all tenants. The proviso to it is only an excepting clause and it lifts that ban in the circumstances mentioned in it. It follows that the proviso, though it does not expressly mention tenants, permits orders for recovery of possession against them alone. The tenant in Clause (b) of the proviso means only the tenant sought to be evicted under the proviso, such tenant having also to be by the express terms of the clause, a tenant who has assigned his tenancy. This follows from the use of the article "the " before the word "tenant" there. Therefore the only person against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made under Clause (b) of the proviso to sub -s. (1) of s. 14 is the tenant who has assigned his tenancy. No such order can, hence, be made against the person to whom the tenancy has been assigned. As the appellant was such a person, no order for eviction could be made against it. I wish to observe at once that if this contention is correct - which I did not think it is - then the order could never be made against the appellant and the fact that Allen Berry & Co. ceased to be a party to the proceedings made no difference in this regard.
(3.) THE argument of the appellant is really based on the article "the" prefixed to the word "tenant" in Clause (b) of the proviso. It is paid that the article clearly indicates that the only person against whom an order for ejectment can be made under Clause (b) is the tenant who assigns or sub -lets or parts with possession of the tenancy without the landlord's consent. I am unable to accept this argument. The proviso expressly states that an order for ejectment can be made "on one or more of the following grounds" and then sets the grounds out in the different clauses that follow, one of which is Clause (b) with which we are concerned. The clauses, therefore, set out the circumstances in which the operative part of the proviso is set in motion, that is, the circumstances in which an order for recovery of possession may be made. If this is so, as I think it is, the clauses could not have been intended to indicate the person against whom an order for recovery of possession could be made. This purpose was entirely different. I am not suggesting that an order for recovery of possession against the assigning tenant cannot be made. All that I say is that the clauses do not intend to indicate the persons against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made and so it cannot be argued that the order cannot be made against any other person.;