Subba Rao, J. - (1.) This appeal by certificate raises the question whether an appeal lies under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under S. 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958), hereinafter called the Act.
(2.) The facts relevant to the question raised may be briefly stated. The respondents are the owners of plot No. 5, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. M/s. Allen Berry and Co. Private Lt. took a lease of the same under a lease deed dated March 1, 1956. M/s. Allen Berry and Co. assigned their interest under the said lease deed to South Asia Industries (Private) Ltd., the appellant herein. Thereafter, the respondents filed an application before the Controller, Delhi, under S. 14 of the Act for the eviction of the appellant from the said premises on the ground that M/s. Allen Berry and Co. unauthorizedly assigned the said premises in favour of the appellant. The Controller by his order dated October 10, 1962; allowed the petition. On January 23, 1963, the appeal filed by the appellant against the said order was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. Against the said order of the Tribunal the appellant filed an appeal in the High Court of Punjab under S. 39 of the Act. The said second appeal was dismissed on May 10, 1963, by Harbans Singh, J. The appellant filed an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge to Division Bench of the said High Court under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent. That appeal came up for disposal before a Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the same on the ground that it was not maintainable. Hence the present appeal.
(3.) Mr. A. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant raised before us the following points; (1) Section 39 of the Act confers a right of appeal from an order of the Rent Control Tribunal to the High Court and, therefore, when once that appeal reaches the High Court, it has to exercise the jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises other appellate jurisdiction, that is to say the judgment of a single Judge in that appeal becomes subject to an appeal to the High Court under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, (2) S. 43 of the Act is only a bar to initiate collateral proceedings for the purpose of questioning the order of the Tribunal and it does not make the judgment of a single Judge in an appeal under S. 39 of the Act final; and, that apart, a Letters Patent appeal is not a separate appeal to the High Court but is only, in effect, the continuation of the same appeal in the High Court.;