KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH Vs. COLLECTOR ANA DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF HAZARIBAGH
LAWS(SC)-1955-10-17
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decided on October 28,1955

KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH Appellant
VERSUS
COLLECTOR ANA DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF HAZARIBAGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Imam, J. - (1.) The petitioners have filed this application under Art. 32 of the Constitution claiming that the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and marked "A" (hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties) did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was at one time the owner of the disputed properties which lie within Touzi No. 28 of the Collectrate of Hazaribagh. On 29-12-1947 petitioner No. 1 as owner leased out the disputed properties to a Company known as Mineral Development Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the company). The Company book possession of the disputed properties and has been paying rent. On 7-4-1949 petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the disputed properties to three trustees, namely, himself and petitioners 2 and 3. The Company has been paying rent to the trustees since then. The Act came into force on 25-9-1950. On 3-11-1951 the State Government issued a notification under S. 3(1) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity specified therein had passed to and become vested in the State. One 26-10-1953 a notice under S. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to the Company, and on 4-3-1954 the State Government issued a notification under S. 3(1) of the Act purporting to vest in the State the properties covered by the above-mentioned deed of settlement and another deed of settlement with which we are not concerned. The Company instituted a title suit No. 33 of 1951 against the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity the genuineness of which was challenged by the State. Petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party to this suit. The Company also instituted a title suit No. 9 of 1954 against the State of Bihar to which petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice dated 26-10-1953 under S. 4(h) of the Act. On 11-11-1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No. 53 of 1954 to which the Company, petitioner No. 1 in his individual capacity, the three trustees and others were made parties. By this suit the State of Bihar challenged the genuineness of the lease is favour of the Company and the deed of settlement in favour of the trustees.
(2.) The real question for determination is, what vested in the State on the publication of the notification under S. 3 and by virtue of the provisions of S. 4(a) of the Act According to Mr. Chatterjee the disputed properties did not vest in the State, whatever else may have. Having regard to the definition of "estate" in the Act, if anything vested in the State on the publication of notification it was the land comprised in the notified estate. Although the disputed properties stood on the land in the notified estate, they did not vest in the State, because the definition of "estate" speaks of land only and not of any building on it. The notification under S. 3 was a mere declaration and actual vesting took place under S. 4(a). On the date of vesting the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No. 1, who had parted with his right, title land interest therein long before the Act was enacted and the publication of the notification under S. 3. Mr. Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar, on the other hand, consented that on a perusal of the provisions of Ss. 4, 5 and 7 of the Act, it would appear that the Act contemplated something more than the land in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed properties could and did vest in the State on the publication of the notification under S. 3.
(3.) In our opinion, it is of little consequence in the present case whether the notified estate vested in the State by reason of the publication of the notification under S. 3 or by virtue of the provisions of S. 4 of the Act, because in either case a vesting did take place. Although the word 'land' is used in the definition of 'estate', the provisions of Ss. 4, 5 and 7 show the necessary intention to include something more than the land when an estate vests in the State. Under S. 4(a) it is not only the estate but also building a certain description and other things which vest in the State absolutely, on the publication of a notification under S. 3. Under Ss. 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned therein also vest in the State, because the buildings in question are deemed to be settled by the State with the intermediary in possession. This could only be on the supposition that these buildings vested in the State and the person in possession held the same as settlee under the State.;


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