DILUBHAI HADABHAI VANK Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT
LAWS(SC)-2015-1-129
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decided on January 06,2015

Dilubhai Hadabhai Vank Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Though there is delay of 3102 days involved in these matters, as the question of law involved is limited to the extent as to the interpretation of Section 427(2) of Cr.P.C., we are inclined to condone the delay and consider the matters on merits. Accordingly, the delay is condoned. Leave granted.
(2.) The appellant was convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC in Sessions Case No.8/1994 of the judgment dated 14.10.1998. He was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. While he was on furlough leave hatched a conspiracy and killed the deceased along with two other accused. The Trial Court while convicting the appellant imposed death sentence. On appeal, the High Court by impugned judgment in Confirmation Case dated 29th, No.6/2004 along with Crl.A. No.1497/2004 30th September and 3rd October, 2005 commuted the death sentence to one of life imprisonment. However, ultimately after noticing the earlier life sentence imposed on the appellant in Sessions Case No.8/1994, the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to state that the substantive sentences imposed on the appellant should run consecutively. While issuing notice in this appeal, we were mainly concerned with the question of interpretation of Section 427(2) which does not provide for such a direction as has been issued by the Division Bench for the continuous suffering of the life imprisonment one after other by the appellant. Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: - "427(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence."
(3.) In fact the question is no longer res integra, inasmuch as this very question was already considered by this Court and the legal principle has been set down in clear terms in the decision rendered in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Another, reported in (1991) 4 SCC 304. Paragraph 9 is relevant for our purpose, the relevant part of which reads as under: - "...It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the proceeding portion has to be read. This last sentence in the direction means that in case, any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the earlier sentence of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission or commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the earlier sentence alone. In other words, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out merely because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority. The consequence is that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sentence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence is also granted to the petitioner. It is in this manner that the direction is given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently. (Underlining is ours) ;


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