- (1.) Heard Mr. K.K. Venugopal and Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior Counsel, along with Mr. Manu Nair, learned Counsel for the Appellants and Ms. Kirti R. Mishra, learned Counsel for the Respondent. The present appeals have been preferred assailing the judgment and order dated 28th July, 2010, passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P.(C) No. 5302 of 2009, W.P.(C) No. 13228 of 2009 and W.P.(C) No. 15075 of 2009. The High Court in the concluding paragraph has directed thus: "In view of the above, the impugned order dated 19.2.2009 and the order of attachment dated 26.3.2008 are quashed. The executing Court is directed to calculate the amount payable under the award as indicated above, keeping in view the principles laid down by the apex Court in S.L. Arora and determine as to whether any further amount is payable to the opposite party. In case any amount is found to have been paid in excess to the opposite party, the State-Petitioner is entitled to refund of the same."
(2.) It is apt to state here that the High Court has placed reliance on the decision rendered in State of Haryana and Ors. v. S.L. Arora and Company, 2010 3 SCC 690. It is submitted by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants that the judgment in S.L. Arora , has been declared as not good law by the majority in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. Governor, State of Orissa, 2015 2 SCC 189, which is the case in hand. In the said case, Bobde, J., in paragraph 21, has opined thus: "In the result, I am of the view that S.L. Arora's case is wrongly decided in that it holds that a sum directed to be paid by an Arbitral Tribunal and the reference to the Award on the substantive claim does not refer to interest pendente lite awarded on the "sum directed to be paid upon Award" and that in the absence of any provision of interest upon interest in the contract, the Arbitral Tribunal does not have the power to award interest upon interest, or compound interest either for the pre-award period or for the post-award period. Parliament has the undoubted power to legislate on the subject and provide that the Arbitral Tribunal may award interest on the sum directed to be paid by the Award, meaning a sum inclusive of principal sum adjudged and the interest, and this has been done by Parliament in plain language."
(3.) Sapre, J., in his concurring opinion, in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32, has ruled thus: "Therefore, I am inclined to hold that the amount award Under Section 31(7)(a) of the Act, whether with interest or without interest, constitutes a "sum" for which the award is made. Coming now to the post-award interest, Section 31(7)(b) of the Act employs the words, "A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award....". Clause (b) uses the words "arbitral award" and not the Arbitral Tribunal". The arbitral award, as held above, is made in respect of a "sum" which includes the interest. It is, therefore, obvious that what carries Under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act is the "sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award" and not any other amount much less by or under the name "interest". In such situation, it cannot be said that what is being granted Under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act is "interest on interest". Interest under Clause (b) is granted on the "sum" directed to be paid by an arbitral award wherein the "sum" is nothing more than what is arrived at under Clause (a). Therefore, in my view, the expression "grant of interest on interest" while exercising the power Under Section 31(7) of the Act does not arise and, therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal is well empowered to grant interest even in the absence of clause in the contract for grant of interest.";