- (1.) This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the A. P. High court allowing the tax revision case filed by the respondent-assessee under section 22 of the A. P. General Sales Tax Act. The order of assessment was made in the month of September, 1969. That order was sought to be revised by the Deputy Commissioner under Ss. (2 of section 20 of the Act. After hearing the respondent, the Deputy Commissioner passed orders prejudicial to the assessee. The Deputy Commissioner says that he passed the said orders on 6/01/1973, but it was served upon the assessee only on 21/11/1973. According to section 20, an order in revision must he passed within four years of the order of assessment. In this case, service of this order is after the expiry of four years from the date of the order of assessment. In the circumstances, the assessee raised a contention that the order was in fact made after the expire' of four years but was ante-dated, and therefore, it is bad. The High court accepted this submission but on a different reasoning. The High court was of the opinion that every order must be communicated within a reasonable period and since the order of the Deputy Commissioner in this case was not so communicated, the High court declared that the respondent-assessee shall not be bound by it. This was done by the High court following its decision in T. R. C. No. 1 of 1976 pronounced on the same day [against which judgment Civil No. 1014 of 1977 (in this batch) has been filed]. We art; of the opinion that the theory evolved by the High court may not be really called for in the circumstances of the case. We are of the opinion that this appeal has to be dismissed on the ground urged by the assessee himself. As stated above, the order of the Deputy Commissioner is said to have been made on 6/01/1973, but it was served upon the assessee on 21/11/1973. i. e. , precisely 10 months later. There is no explanation from the Deputy Commissioner why it was so delayed. If there, had been a proper explanation, it would have been a different matter. But, in the absence of any explanation whatsoever, we must presume that the order was not made on the date it purports to have been made. It could' have been made after the expiry of the prescribed four years' period. The Civil is accordingly dismissed.;