- (1.) The respondent, Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad, was employed as a Daily Wager (casual employee) in the service of the Post and Telegraph Department of the government of India. His last appointment was of 24/3/1986. He reported for work till 22/9/1986 and thereafter he did not turn up for work altogether. He was, therefore, discharged from service w. e. f. 7/10/1986. He produced a medical certificate on 25/10/1986 purporting to state that he was suffering from schizophrenia. However, nothing further happened thereafter till 1990 when he filed a petition in the central Administrative tribunal. Bombay bench, claiming to be a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He also contended that since the Post and Telegraph Department was an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of that Act, the employer was bound to follow the procedure outlined in Section 25-F which was not followed even though he had completed 240 days of service, a fact which is not in dispute. The tribunal came to the conclusion that he could not have been discharged from service without following the requirements of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The tribunal, therefore, directed that he be reinstated in sen-ice with full back wages. Aggrieved by this decision, the Union of India has approached this court by way of special leave.
(2.) The learned counsel for the Union of India raised a preliminary contention, namely, that the application was filed almost after about four years from the date of discharge and, therefore, it was clearly barred by Section 21 of the Administrative tribunals Act, 1985. He pointed out that this question was squarely raised in the counter filed in answer to the respondent's application in the following terms: "These respondents state that the applicant herein is challenging the order dated 7/10/1986 discharging him from the service and has filed this application on 14/9/1990, as such this application is barred by the provisions of limitation under Section 21 of the central Administrative tribunals Act, 1985. "when we turn to the judgment of the tribunal we find that there is no mention about the question of limitation even though it stared in the face. It would immediately occur to anyone that since the order of discharge was of 7/10/1986 and the application was filed in 1990, it was clearly barred by limitation unless an application for condoning the delay was made under Section 21 (3 of the Administrative tribunals Act. No such application was in fact made. Even if it was the contention of the employee that he was suffering from schizophrenia. that could have been projected as a ground for condonation of delay under Ss. (3 of Section 21 of the said statute. Even otherwise without insisting on the formality of an application under Section 21 (3 if the tribunal had dealt with the question of limitation in the context of Section 21 we may have refrained from interfering with the order of the tribunal under Article 136, but it seems that the tribunal totally overlooked this question which clearly stared in the face. Even the employee made no effort to explain the delay and seek condonation. We find no valid explanation on record for coming to the conclusion that the case for condonation of delay is made out. In the circumstances, there is no doubt that the application was clearly barred by limitation. It is also difficult to understand how the tribunal could have awarded full back wages even for the period of delay for which the employee was solely responsible. However, since application itself is barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative tribunals Act, it deserves to be dismissed.
(3.) In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the tribunal is set aside. The application of the respondent in the tribunal will stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs throughout.;