JUDGEMENT
K. Ramaswamy, J. -
(1.) Admittedly the appellant was registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act. Its object appears to be to develop the land and allot plots thereof to its members for construction of houses. Notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 for short the Act was published in the State Gazette on February 8, 1979, acquiring an extent of 71 acres 56 cents of land situated in Moolasagaram near Nandyal in Kurnool Dist. for the aforesaid purpose. A report under S. 5A of the enquiry, was submitted to the Govt. The appellant entered into an agreement under S. 41 of the Act dated December 12, 1981 with the Govt. treating the appellant as a company and it was published in the Gazette dated February 4, 1982. But it was given up. The State thereafter contributed Rs. 100 for each acquisition and got declarations under S. 6, published in the State Gazette on February 4, 1982 to an extent of 54 acres 66 cents and on January 19, 1984 for another extent of 16 acres 19 cents. It is not necessary to mention the previous history of the litigation but suffice to state that a single Judge dismissed one writ petition and allowed other writ petitions on December 9, 1985 on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Part VII of the Act had not been followed holding when the acquisition was for public purpose. On appeals the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 316 of 1986 etc. by judgment dated December 6, 1986, quashed the notification under Sec. 4(1) and the declarations under Sec. 6, primarily on two grounds, namely, (1)that the respondents are small farmers; (2) the appellant society consists of members who could afford to construct houses by themselves; (3) acquiring the lands of the poor small farmers for the benefit of the rich is arbitrary and the contribution of Rs. 100/- each by the Government is a colourable exercise of the power to avoid the mandatory requirements in Chapter VII of the Act. In these appeals we are concerned with 40 acres of land, since other owners have not challenged the acquisition.
(2.) Sri Sitaramaiah, the learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that once the Government contributed Rs. 200/- from the public exchequer, the public purpose envisaged under S. 3(f) of the Act is satisfied and the requirements envisaged in Chapter VII need not be followed. Alternatively it was contended that once the acquisition was found to be for providing house sites to the members of the Co-operative Society, it was a public purpose and that, therefore, mandatory requirement of Chapter VII was not required to be followed. In either event, it was contended that the High Court was wrong in quashing the notification and the declarations on the ground that the acquisition of the small farmers inferentially offends Art. 14 and Proviso to Art. 31A of the Constitution is unwarranted.
(3.) Section 2(e) of the Act defined company under pre 1984 Amendment Act as meaning a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882. . . .and included a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or any other law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State. Section 2(f) defined the expression public purpose to include the provision of village-sites in districts in which the appropriate Government shall have declared by notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provision. Chapter VII deals with the acquisition of land for companies. Article 31 of the Constitution (preceding 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1978) prohibits compulsory acquisition of the property for anything except for a public purpose. Public purpose is not capable of precise definition. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which acquisition is sought for. It is to serve the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual. Public purpose broadly speaking would include the purpose in which the general interest of the society as opposed to the particular interest of the individual is directly and vitally concerned. Generally the executive would be the best Judge to determine whether or not the impugned purpose is a public purpose. Yet it is not beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny. The interest of a section of the society may be public purpose when it is benefitted by the acquisition. The acquisition in question must indicate that it was towards the welfare of the people and not to benefit a private individual or group of individuals joined collectively. Therefore, acquisition for anything which is not for a public purpose cannot be done compulsorily. Admittedly, there is no group housing scheme approved by the State Government. On the other hand, housing schemes are being executed by the A.P. Housing Board under the Act. We are not concerned the public purpose as amended under the 1984 Act.;
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