- (1.) The property in question is a two-storeyed building, each floor admeasuring about 2300 square feet, there being six rooms on the ground floor. This property originally belonged to one Amar Chand Gangwal. The said Amar chand Gangwal inducted the respondent Kishori Lal Goenka as a tenant in respect of the second floor of the building. Later on, the said Amar Chand gangwal sold one-half undivided share in the property to Kalyan Chand and the other one-half share to Surender Kumar. In June 1961, a tenant was inducted in the first floor of the property also. It appears that Surender Kumar executed a document styled "declaration-cum-release deed" in favour of the partnership firm of M/s Ratan Lal Bansi Lal. By that document the executant Surender kumar admitted the fact that he was the benamidar of one-half share in the property conveyed by Amar Chand Gangwal under a deed of conveyance dated 7/11/1950 and that the consideration for the purchase of one-half share was actually paid by the aforesaid firm of which his father was a partner. After execution of this document, the appellant herein entered into an agreement with the firm for the purchase of one-half share which it had derived under the conveyance dated 7/11/1950 acknowledged by the declaration of 24/12/1964. The appellant also entered into another agreement for purchase of the other half share of the property from Kalyan Chand. Under the terms of the said agreement, the appellant came to be put in possession of the ground floor of the property on 18/3/1967. Before the execution of the declaration-cum-release deed by Surender Kumar, it appears that suits were filed for eviction against both the tenants of the first floor and the second floor claiming possession on two grounds, viz. , the arrears of rent and damage caused to property by unauthorised changes made therein. So far as the first ground was concerned, it was not available for the reason that the arrears were made good. The suits were, therefore, confined to the second ground only. However, after the appellant purchased the right, title and interest in the property under the deed of conveyance dated 26/3/1971, it moved an application on 8/1/1972 for being impleaded as Plaintiff 3, which application was allowed. After being so impleaded, the appellant moved an amendment application on 3/12/1976 to add an additional ground for seeking eviction, viz. , that the property was required reasonably and bona fide by the appellant. Thus, the suits proceeded essentially on two grounds, viz. , (1 damage caused to the property by structural alterations; and (2 the appellant's requirement of the property. Incidentally, it may be mentioned here that the title of the appellant was put in question by the tenants.
(2.) The trial court decreed the suit holding that (1 the appellant's predecessor had good and valid title and, therefore, the appellant had a valid title; (2 the tenants were liable to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent; (3 the appellant did not have sufficient accommodation in its possession and consequently, required extra accommodation; and (4 the tenants had illegally and unauthorisedly put up permanent structures in their respective tenements and had, therefore, caused damage and waste to the property. On these findings, thetrial court directed delivery of possession and also granted a preliminary decree for mesne profits. The tenant preferred appeals which were heard by the learned district Judge who allowed the appeals holding that the appellant before us was not the owner of the undivided portion of the premises and. therefore, the suits were not maintainable; (2 the notices to quit were defective; (3 the tenants were neither liable to be evicted on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent, or alleged reasonable requirement of landlord nor were they liable to be evicted on the ground that they had carried out construction activity in their respective premises which had caused waste or damage to the property. The learned district Judge reversed the decrees passed by the trial court. Thereafter the appellant and Respondents 1 and 2 herein preferred second appeals before the high court of Calcutta. When the appeals came up for hearing before a Division bench of the High court, the tenant raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeals relying on an earlier decision in Devki Nandan boobna v. Har Sundar Sarkar. On that basis the division bench referred the matter to a larger bench. The appeals, therefore, came up for hearing before a five-Judge bench presided over by the learned Acting chief justice. The Full bench while upholding the maintainability of the appeals came to the conclusion that by the deed of declaration-cum-release Surender Kumar could not transfer his undivided right, title and interest in the property to the firm of M/s Ratan Lal bansi Lal in view of the provisions in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) act, 1988. The exact view taken in this behalf is to be noticed in para 141 which may be reproduced for ready reference: "It is contended on behalf of the appellant that Surender Kumar, the benamidar by executing the registered instrument styled 'deed of release' conveyed his right, title and interest in the suit property but such argument runs counter to the other arguments of the appellant-plaintiffs that Surender kumar is the benamidar of the partnership firm, appellant-plaintiff I. When the appellant-plaintiff I claims that it is the real owner, the ostensible owner being the benamidar, it is no more open to it to argue that there was a conveyance by the deed of release. The benamidar before the enactment of benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act could not have any right, title and interest in the property which the benamidar could convey. So, the deed of release could be said to be a mere declaration, a mere admission that the executant, i. e. the benamidar, had no right or interest in the property and it could not operate as conveyance. Then the execution of the deed by surendra Kumar is of no consequence. "
(3.) The full bench of the High court also took the view that the notices to quit were illegal and invalid as one of the landlords who issued notices was not entitled to give the notice and the said defect was fatal to the suit; that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of reasonable requirements; unauthorised structural alterations amounting to waste and damage to the property, etc. , were unassailable. Consequently, the full bench of the high court dismissed the appeals. Hence, these appeals by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution.;