- (1.) Leave granted. The appellant admittedly entered into two agreements with the respondents, one on 16/2/1979 and another thereafter, for referring the dispute of determining the market value of the lands in Khasra No. 1134 in Bharatpur City of Rajasthan. Originally a notification under Section 4 (1 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 was published in the Gazette on 13/3/1973 acquiring 237 bighas of land for the purpose of establishing an industry by the respondents Hindustan Development Corporation Ltd. Section 6 declaration was also published on 30/9/1975. Before its publication, the appellants challenged the validity of Section 4 (1 of notification by filing the writ petition in the High court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. On appeal, the division bench by its judgment dated 5/10/1976 allowed the appeal and quashed the notification under Section 4 (1. Therespondents came in appeal and obtained leave under Article 136 in CA No. 2482 of 1977. In appeal of the State government also leave is granted. While the appeal is pending, as stated earlier, the appellants had entered into an agreement for reference to the arbitrator of the matter to determine the market value. There was a further agreement between the parties at the suggestion of the arbitrator agreeing for release of 104 bighas of land from the acquisition. The arbitrator by his award dated 19-6-1985 determined the market value of 95 bighas of land at Rs. 9,000. 00 per bigha which worked out to Rs. 8,55,000. 00 and for 50 bighas of land at Rs. 4,500. 00 which worked out to Rs. 2,25,000. 00. He also awarded solatium at 10% in terms of Section 23 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act as agreed by the parties together with compensation for the compound and trees. In all a sum of Rs. 12,18,700. 00 was awarded.
(2.) The respondents filed an application to make the award, the rule of the court. The appellants filed applications under S. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for short the Act, to set aside the award. The District Judge remitted the award for reconsideration. The respondents challenged the order of remittance by filing a revision in the High court. The High court in the impugned order set aside the order of remittance and made the award rule of the court. Thus this appeal by special leave against the order of the High court in CRP No. 163 of 1990, dated 1/12/1993.
(3.) Shri P. P. Juneja, learned counsel for the appellants sought to raise several contentions impugning the validity of the award and order of the High court. In our view, all these contentions have no relevance. It is seen that while the appeal is pending before this court, parties have entered into a contract agreeing to refer the matter to a chosen forum namely a retired Judge of the High court to determine the market value as provided under Section 23 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. Therefore, the arbitrator is strictly bound by the principles laid down in the Rajasthan Act in determining the market value. He considered the entire evidences placed before him in one way or other, either agreeing or disagreeing with the contentions of the counsel for parties and fixed the market value according to the principles laid down in Section 23. Though it is sought to be contended by Mr P. P. Juneja that the arbitrator misconducted himself in rejecting the evidence placed before him in a reasoned order and, therefore, the rejection does constitute a legal misconduct. We find no force. When the matter lies being in the realm of appreciation of evidence, the arbitrator is entitled to reach his conclusions and conclusions do not constitute legal misconduct warranting the setting aside of the award. The District Judge considered the arguments as if it is an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, set aside the award and remitted the case for reconsideration. It is a wrong procedure adopted by the civil court. It is further contended that arbitrator did not pass award within the prescribed period after remand nor did the arbitrator make any award and, therefore, by operation of Section 16 (3. ) of the Act, the award has become void and it is unenforceable. We do not find any force in the contention. Since the respondents carried in revision to the High court, of the remand order, the need to pass the award was obviated. The High court has gone into the legality of the order of remand. The High court for the reasons mentioned in its order did not accept the civil court's reasoning quite correctly and rightly. Accordingly, it set aside the order of remittance. We havegone through the order of the High court and we find that the High court is justified in setting aside the order of remand made by the District court. Section 16 (3, therefore, becomes inapplicable. It is also open to the High court to decide as to whether the case needs remand to the District Judge to make the award rule of the court. With a view to avoid further delay, the High court exercised its discretion and made the award, rule of the court. Thus, we find that the award having been made rule of the court and it is not vitiated by any illegality. We do not find any ground warranting interference in this appeal.;