- (1.) Leave granted.
(2.) We have heard the learned counsel on both sides. The respondent was appointed as Asstt. Block Superintendent on November 30, 1972, subject to the terms of the contract. Two of the terms, relevant for the purpose of this case, are that his service was liable to be terminated with one month notice or pay in lieu thereof as per C1. (9), and such termination would be subject to arbitration as provided under C1. (14). The employee also shall be, subject to C1.(12), bound by the law, statutes and regulations issued by the officer or authority of the University, competent to issue in that behalf and was in force. On March 26, 1976 the service of the respondent was terminated. The respondent filed the civil suit for a declaration that his order of termination was illegal, as he was not given an opportunity to defend himself, and that it was by way of punishment. The trial Court in its decree dated 24-4-1981 decreed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the order. When second appeal was filed in the High Court, initially, it was dismissed on the ground of limitation. In C.A.No. 785/89, this Court set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the case directing it to dispose of the matter on merits, in Second Appeal No.2908/92, by judgment and decree dated August 7,1992, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate Court and confirmed that of the trial Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
(3.) Though Shri Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the order of dismissal dated 26-3-1976 impugned in the Civil Suit No. 16/80 was barred by limitation as on date of suit three years period of limitation had expired by efflux of time, that point is no longer open to the appellant to canvass it as the order of this Court operates as res judicata. Therefore, the suit was filed within the limitation.;