- (1.) The narrow question which requires to be determined in this appeal is as to the interpretation of Section 38-B of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as 'the Shops Act') and the Standing Orders issued under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereafter referred to as the 'standing Orders Act'). The terms of grant of special leave require so.
(2.) The appellant is a Public Limited Company. It has branches throughout the country, one of which is at Nagpur. The branch at Nagpur is registered under the Shops Act. According to the appellant its personnel never exceeded 7 and at the relevant time that was the number it maintained. On 14/2/1984 the second respondent was appointed on probation as a "sales Representative" for the establishment at Nagpur. One of the terms of the contract of employment was that he will be placed on probation for a period of 12 months commencing from 14/2/1984 up to 18/2/1985 or for such extended period as may be determined by the management. In terms thereof the said respondent started working with the appellant. According to the appellant his work and activity was found to be unsatisfactory. By letter dated 24/6/1985, the services of the second respondent were terminated with effect from 24/7/1985. A cheque of a sum representing emoluments as due was sent to the respondent.
(3.) A complaint was filed by the second respondent before the Labour court, Nagpur, under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, alleging inter alia that the appellant company had indulged in an unfair labour practice in terminating his service inasmuch as the standing orders issued under the Standing Orders Act were given a go-by, as on the date of termination of his services, the period of probation of three months, as prescribed under the standing orders, stood completed and in terms thereof he was assumed to have been confirmed in his post as a regular employee. It was asserted by the second respondent that his services could not be terminated on the pretext that his work and activity was unsatisfactory by the appellant by arrogating to itself a large period of probation of about 17 months.;