Bhagwati, J. - (1.) Since we are disposing of this appeal on preliminary point, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail. It would be sufficient if we state only so much of the facts as bear on the preliminary point.
(2.) The appellant was at all material times a member of the Judicial Service of the State of Orissa. He was promoted as an Additional District and Sessions Judges on 31st July, 1968 but by an order dated 30th March, 1972 made by the High Court of Orissa, he was suspended as a disciplinary inquiry was decided to be instituted against him. On 29th April, 1972 a charge-sheet containing eight charges was served on him and he was called upon to show cause why disciplianry action would not be taken against him. In the meantime, on the 10th April, 1972, the appellant addressed an appeal to the Government complaining against the order of suspension passed by the High Court and requesting the Governor to cancel the order of suspension on the ground that it was outside the authority of the High Court. The High Court withheld the appeal of the appellant and refused to forward it to the Governor since in its opinion no appeal lay to the Governor against an order of suspension passed by the High Court. The appeallant thereupon forwarded directly to the Governor a representation dated 14th May, 1972 with a copy of the Registrar of the High Court and by this representation the appellant moved the Governor to transfer the disciplinary inquiry against him to the Administrative Tribunal. There were several statements made in this representation which scandalized the High Court and tended to lower its prestige, dignity and authority and thus constituted criminal contempt of court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court, therefore, suo motu issued a notice dated 3rd July, 1972 calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. The notice set out the passages from the representation made by the appellant to the Governor which, in the prima facie opinion of the High Court, amounted to contempt of court. The proceeding for contempt initiated by this notice was numbered as Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1972. The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and raised several contentions with a view to exonerating himself from the charge of contempt. One of the contentions was that whatever he had said in regard to the judges of the High Court in the representation made by him to th Governor was in regard to their conduct in the discharge of administrative functions and not judicial functions, and therefore, it did not amount to contempt of court. The appellant pleaded before the Full Bench of five judges, which was constituted to hear the proceeding for contempt, that his contention should be tried as a preliminary issue, but the Full Bench rejected the plea of the appellant. The appellant thereupon preferred a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court and in this petition, the appellant once again made statements which prima facie appeared to constitute criminal contempt of court. The petition was rejected by this court but the High Court taking note of the objectionable statements contained in the petition issued a supplementary notice dated 5th January, 1973 to the appellant to show cause why he should not be punished for havingcommitted contempt of court by publishing such statements. The Full Bench thereafter heard the proceeding for contempt on the charges contained in both the notices and by an order dated 5th February, 1973 held the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for two months.
(3.) Meanwhile the disciplinary inquiry instituted under the charge-sheet dated 29th April, 1972 ws entrusted to K. B. Panda, J., and the learned Judge, after holding a proper inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, submitted a report dated 2nd August, 1972 finding the appellant guilty of all the eight charges set out in the charge-sheet except charge No. 4 (a). The High Court considered the report at a Full Court meeting of the judges and finding itself in agreement with the report, the High Court issued a show cause notice calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be reduced to the rank of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial). The appellant was granted personal hearing and after considering the explanation give by him, the High Court again at a Full Court meeting of all the judges held on 8th December, 1972, found the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him except charge No. 4 (a) and reduced him to the rank of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial). The appellant took the view that some of the issues arising in the disciplinary inquiry were the same as those arising in the proceeding for contempt which was pending against him and the decision of those issues by the High Court on the Administrative side in the course of the disciplinary inquiry amounted to prejudging those issues in the proceeding for contempt which was a judicial proceeding and the Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court, who decided the disciplinary inquiry were, therefore, guilty of criminal contempt of their own High Court. The appellant, therefore, as soon as the proceeding for contempt was decided by the Full Bench on 5th February, 1973, moved the Full Bench for initiating proceeding for contempt against the Chief Justice and other judges in their person capacity. The motion of the appellant was heard by a full Bench of three judges and by an order dated 13th February, 1973 the Bench held that in its opinion there was no contempt of court committed by the Chief Justice and the other judge and in any event, by reason of S. 15, sub-section (1), the appellant was not entitled to move the High Court for taking action against the Chief Justice and other judges since he had not obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General and the Bench accordingly declined to take any action on the motion of the appellant. The appellant thereupon, purporting to avail if the right of appeal granted under Section 19, sub-section (1), preferred the present appeal to this Court.;