Jaganmohan Reddy - (1.) THE appeal and the writ petition No. 40 of 1968 are by the Press Trust of India, while writ petition No. 37 of 1968 is by the Indian National Press (Bombay) Ltd. THE appeal and the wriit petitions challenge the order dated 27/10/1967 issued by the first respondent the Union of India, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation (Department of Labour and Employment) accepting the recommendations of 642 the Wage Board' constituted under S. 9 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) -hereinafter referred to as 'the Act"-as violating Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. THE order accepting the recommendations in respect of the wages, scales of pay etc. of the working journalists was subject to certain minor modifications therein specified, being modifications which in the opinion of the central government did not effect important alterations in the character of the recommendations. THE second respondent is the Indian Federation of Working Journalists.
(2.) AT the outset a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the first respondent, which was also supported by the second respondent, that the appeal is not maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the central government which passed the order dated 27/10/1967 is neither a court nor a tribunal, and the order passed by it is not a judicial order but a statutory order-a piece of subordinate legislation. It may here be mentioned that caveats were entered into at the time when special leave petitions came for hearing on 26/09/1968, and this court granted leave on that day subject to the right to urge the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeals. So far as the Writ Petition are concerned, an objection has also been raised that as the second petitioner A. B. Nair in writ petition No. 37 of 1968 had died during the pendency of the petition and as anapplication had been filed in writ petition No. 40 of 1968 to delete the name of the second petitioner Uma Shankar Dikshit, the first petitioner in both the petitions being limited companies, the reliefs claimed could only be confined to Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution and not to Article 19 under which the guarantee of fundamental rights is only available to a citizen of India, which the limited companies are not. In order to appreciate these objections it is necessary to set out certain provisions of law and indisputable facts. Under S. 9 of the Act, there is power to constitute a Wage Board for fixing or revising rates of wages in respect of working journalists. Once the Board is constituted it shall, by a notice published in such manner as it thinks fit, call upon newspaper establishments and working journalists and other persons interested in the fixation or revision of rates of wages of working journalists to make such representations as they may think fit [Section 10(1)]; every such representation shall be in writing and shall be made within such period as the Board may specify in the notice and shall state the rates of wages which in the opinion of the person making the representation, would be reasonable [Section 10(2)]. After taking into account the representations and after examining the materials, the Board shall make such recommendations as it thinks fit to the central government for the fixation or revision of rates of wages with effect from a date as may be specified by the Board [Section 10(3)]. It is further provided in S. 10(4) that in making any recommendations to the central government, the Board shall have regard to the cost of living, the prevalent rates of wages for oparable employment, the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry .in different regions of the country and to any other circumstances which to the Board may seem relevant. Thecentral government had, in exercise of the powers conferred under Second 9 of the Act, constituted a Wage Board and after receiving the recommondations of that Board published them in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated 11/05/1957. The Commissioner of Labour, Madras, isued a circlur on 30/05/1957, calling upon the management of all 643 newspaper establishments in the State to send to him the report of the gross revenue for the three years, i. e. 1952, 1953 and 1954, within a period of one month from the date of the publication of the Board's decision, i. e. not later than 10/06/1957. Thereafter Writ Petition were filed by Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. etc. challenging the vires of the Act on the ground that the provisions of the Act were violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1) (a), 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. The decision of the Wage Board was challenged on various grounds which were in pari materia with the objections that had been urged by the representatives of the employers in the minutes of dissent which they had appended and it was contended that the implementation of the decision would be beyond the capacity of the petitioners and would result in their total collapse. This court had in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Another v. The Union of India held certain provisions of the Act to be ultra vires and so far as S. 9(1) of the Act was concerned, it held that that S. when properly construed made it incumbent on the Wage Board to take into consideration the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay the rates and scales of wages recommended by it and as there was nothing to indicate that it had done so, its decision was void and inoperative. I (further held that the impugned Act, judged by its provisions, was not such a law but was a beneficent legislation intended to regulate the conditions of service of the working journalists and the consequences that were adverted to in that case could not be the direct and inevitable result of it. It also expressed the view 'that although there could be no doubt that liberty of the press was an essential part of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a) and if the law were to single out the press to lay prohibitive burdens it would fall outside the protection afforded by Article 19(2), the impugned Act which directly affected the press and fell outside the categories of protection mentioned in Article 19(2) had not the effect of taking away or abridging the freedom of speech and expression of the petitioners and did not, therefore, infringe Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Nor could it be held to be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in view of the test of reasonableness laid down by this court.
(3.) THE question whether the functions performed by the Wage Board are administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial, or legislative in character was also raised before this court in the Express Newspapers case (supra). This question was said to assume importance on two grounds, viz. (i) whether the decisions of the wage boards are open to judicial review, and (ii) whether the principle of audi alteram partem applies to the proceedings before the Wage Boards. If the functions performed by them were administrative or legislative in character, they would not be subject to judicial review, and not only would they not be amenable to writs of certiorari or prohibition under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, they would also not be amenable to the exercise of special leave jurisdiction under Article 136. THEir decisions, moreover, would not be vulnerable on the ground that the principle of audi alteram partem, i. e. no man shall be condemned unheard, was not followed in the course of the proceedings before them and the procedure adopted by them was contrary to the principles of natural justice. After examining the principles and the cases in which the character of the functions of the tribunals or the Boards as such had been considered, this court expressed the view that it was not possible to hold that the functions performed by the Wage Boards are necessarily of a legislative character. THE 644 test for determining these controversies was stated thus at pp. 112 and 113: ".....................regard must be had to the provisions of the statutes constituting the wage boards. If on a scrutiny of the provisions in regard thereto one can come to the conclusion that they are appointed only with a view to determine the relations between the employers and the employees in the future in regard to the wages payable to the employees there would be justification for holding that they were performing legislative functions. If, however, on a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the statutes bringing the wage boards into existence, it appears that the powers and procedure exercised by them are assimilated to those of Industrial tribunals or their adjudications are subject to judicial review at the hands of higher tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it cannot be predicated that these wage boards are exercising legislative functions. Whether they exercise these functions or not is thus to be determined by the relevant provisions of the statutes incorporating them and it would be impossible to lay down any universal rule which would help in the determination of this question." Having stated that even if on the construction of the relevant provisions of the statute the functions performed by a particular wage board are not of a legislative character, this court nonetheless observed that "the question still remains whether the functions exercised by them are administrative in character or judicial or quasi-judicial in character, because only in the latter event would their decision be amenable to the writ jurisdiction or to the "special leave jurisdiction above referred to". After examining this aspect at pp. 117-118 the court said: "THEre is considerable force in these contentions, but we do not feel called upon to express our final opinion on this question in view of the conclusions which we have hereafter reached in regard to the ultra vires character of the decision of the Wage Board itself. We are however bound to observe that whatever be the character of the functions performed by the Wage Boards whether they be legislative or quasijudicial, if proper safeguards are adopted of the nature discussed earlier, e. g., provision for judicial review or the adopting of the procedure as in the case of the recommendations of the wage councils in the United Kingdom, or the reports of the advisory committees which come to be considered by the administrator under the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 in the United States of America, no objection could ever be urged against the determinations of the Wage Boards thus arrived at on the score of the principles of natural justice having been violated." After the decision in the Express Newspaper case (supra). Parliament, having regard to the observations made therein, amended the provisions of the Act, and by Act 65 of 1962 substituted S. 8,9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 by new S. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 13-A. The learned Solicitor-General contends that after these amendments every person affected was given an opportunity of hearing. The government was not required to give reasons where it was varying the recommendations, nor was it necessary for it to give reasons where it was accepting the recommendations of the Wage Board, nor did any of the provisions in S. 8 to 12 provide for a judicial determination of a right, flor did they lay down any principles to be applied to the facts for determining the rights of the parties. On the other hand, these provisions, according to him, are in general terms which indicate the policy and provide merely a general guidance leaving it to the delegated 645 authority, viz. the government, a substantial scope for a policy decision which can only result in the order being a legislative order. On this aspect he submitted two propositions : (i) in the case of a parent law which provides for a judicial determination of a right it must lay down the necessary principles to be applied to the facts so that the rights of the parties could be determined; and (ii) if the parent law in the general terms enunciates the policy and provides merely for general guidance which leaves to the delegated authority a substantial scope for a policy decision, then the order is a piece of subordinate legislation and not a judicial order. In support of these propositions he has cited the decisions in The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. The State of Ajmer dealing with the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; M/s. Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya v. Sangamner Akola TolukaBidi Kamgar Union , and the observations of this court in the Express Newspapers' case (supra), at pp. 164 and 165. It is contended that the investigation leading up to the order does not involve a decision in terms of the existing law, nor is there any requirement of determination of existing rights, nor is the existence of a dispute a condition of the exercise of jurisdiction. All that is required by the central government is for it to make an order in terms of the recommendations or subject to such modifications which the central government thinks fit. It is not a decision between any contending parties, but is largely a policy decision made within the framework and in the light of the guidance provided by the Act.;