Beg, J. - (1.) The petitioner, Ram Bali Rajbhar, in this Habeas Corpus petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeks release from a detention ordered on 1-10-1973 by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, on the following grounds supplied on the same day to him: "(1) On 5-9-1973 at about 17.40 hrs., you along with your associates Anwar Hossain of 18/2, Mominpur Road, Subal Das of Jhupri at Dock East Boundary Road Calcutta, and others, all being armed with iron-rods, lathis and bombs created a great disturbance of public order by hurling bombs at the tea-stall of Lal Mohan Jadav at 19, Coal Berth, Calcutta, endangering the lives and safety of the stall-owner and other nearby shop-keepers, as he had refused to supply tea to you all, without payment. The incident brought wide spread panic in the locality, led to the closure of shops, suspension of vehicular traffic, thereby jeopardising the maintenance of public order.(2) On 9-9-1973 at about 20.05 hrs. you along with your-associates Kali Das alias Tenia of Jhupri at Strand Road, Calcutta, Subed Ali of 5/2 Bhukailash Road and others, all being armed with iron-rods, lathis and bombs, attacked a watch repairing shop styled as M/s. Babloo Watch and Repairing Co., at 52,Circular Garden Reach Road, Calcutta, by hurling bombs and damaging furniture, watches, show-cases of the said shop as Sk. Azim, the owner of this shop had earlier refused to pay you all for drinks, when the local people came to intervene, you all hurled bombs indiscriminately with a view to kill them. The incident clamped fear, frightfulness and insecurity in the minds of the public thereby affecting public order. And if left free and unfettered you are likely to continue to disturb maintenance of public order by acting in a similar manner as aforesaid."
(2.) The petitioner complains that the grounds of detention are "vague, false, mala fide, fanciful non-existent." It is submitted that there is no rational nexus if the grounds with permissible objects of preventive detention. It is urged that criminal offences for which the authorities charged with maintaining law and order an institute ordinary criminal prosecutions are not meant to be made the subject-matter of detention orders. "Public Order" it is contended, is something more serious than mere breach of the criminal law for which the offender must be dealt with under the ordinary law. "Public Order" mentioned in Section 3 (a) (ii), it is suggested, must be read in conjunction with the "security of the State" so that only a person who indulges in activities which endanger something akin to the security of the State should be deemed to be covered by provisions relating to preventive detention.
(3.) We think it is too late in the day to argue that there is any misuse of the provisions of Maintenance of Internal Security Act (hereinafter referred to a the Act) merely because, in order to arrive at a satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purposes of the security of the State or the maintenance a public order, some instances are given a criminal activity, whether they could have or have formed the subject-matter of successful or unsuccessful prosecution. (See Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta, (1974) 4 SCC 530; Milan Banik v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1214; Mohd. Salim Khan v. C. C. Bose, AIR 1972 SC 1670; Sasti Chowdhary v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 1 SCR 467. An order based upon such grounds cannot be said to be affected by extraneous considerations or become mala fide for this reason only. The legal position on this subject has been recently clarified by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2154 at p 2160 where it was pointed out (p. 2160): " The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.";