- (1.) This is an appeal from a decision of the Election, Tribunal of Gwalior in which the petitioner, an elector, sought to set aside the elections of the appellants (respondents 1 and 2 to the petition) who were the successful candidates. The constituency is Bhilsa, a double member constituency in Madhya Bharat. The petitioner seems to have been fighting on behalf of the 6th and 7th respondents to the petition because one of his prayers is that they be declared to have been duly elected in place of the appellants (respondents 1 and 2). The petitioner succeeded and the Tribunal declared the elections of the two appellants to be void and further declared that the 6th and 7th respondents had been duly elected.
(2.) We will first consider that part of the decision which declares the election of the two appellants to be void.
(3.) The Tribunal finds, among other things, that the appellant No. 1 (1st respondent\) published certain pamphlets which contain statement listed as (a),(b), (c) ,(e), (f) and (g) by the Tribunal. The Tribunal holds that these statement are false and that the 1st appellant (1st respondent) did not believe them to be true. It also holds that these statements reflect on the personal character and conduct of the 6th respondent and are reasonably calculated to prejudice his prospects in this election. These findings were contested and the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the attack was on the public and political character of the 6th respondent and was a legitimate attack. We do not intend to examine this as a Court of appeal because this is a special appeal and all we are concerned to see is whether a tribunal of reasonable and unbiased men could judicially reach such a conclusion. We have had some of these pamphlets read out to us and we are of opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is one which judicial minds could reasonably reach. We decline to examine the matter further in special appeal. Under the law the decision of the Tribunal is meant to be final. That does not take away our jurisdiction but we will only interfere when there is some glaring error which has resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice. On those findings a major corrupt practice on the part of 1st respondent (1st appellant here) under section 123 (5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is established.;