- (1.) These two applications are for relief under Article 32 of the Constitution arising out of similar and connected set of facts and are dealt with together. They arise under the following circumstances. The Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies, Delhi State, lodged information with the Inspector-General Delhi Special Police Establishment to the following effect. Messrs. Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. was registered in his office on 9-7-1946, with an authorised capital of Rs. 10 crores and went into liquidation on 13-6-1952. An investigation into the affairs of the Company was ordered by the Government and the report of the inspector appointed under S. 138, Companies Act indicated that an organised attempt was made from the inception of the Company to misappropriate and embezzle the funds of the Company and declare it to be substantial loss, and to conceal from the share-holders the true state of affairs by submitting false accounts and balance-sheets. Various dishonest and fraudulent transactions were also disclosed which show that false accounts with fictitious entries and false records were being maintained and that dishonest transfers of moneys had been made. It was accordingly alleged that offences under Ss. 406, 408, 409, 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 477(a), Penal Code had been committed. It was also stated that Seth R.K. Dalmia who was the Director and Chairman of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. had been controlling certain other concerns, viz., (1) Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Co., Ltd., (2) Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd. now known as Asia Udyog Ltd. and (3) Allen Berry and Co. Ltd. through his nominees and that all these concerns were utilized in order to commit the frauds. It was further stated therein by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies that to determine the extent of the fraud, it was necessary to get hold of books not only Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. but also of the allied concerns controlled by the Dalmia group, some of which are outside the Delhi State. Lists of the offices and places in which and of the persons in whose custody the records may be available were furnished. Speedy investigation was asked for. This information was recorded by the Special Police on 19-11-1953, as the First Information Report. On the basis thereof an application was made to the District Magistrate, Delhi, under S. 96, Criminal Procedure Code, for the issue of warrants for the search of documents and in the places, as per schedules furnished. Permission to investigate in respect of some of the non-cognisable offences mentioned in the First Information Report was also asked for. On the same day, the District Magistrate ordered investigation of the offences and issued warrants for simultaneous searches at as many as 34 places. The searches were made on 25-11-1953, and subsequent days and a voluminous mass of records was seized from various places. The petitioners pray that the search warrants may be quashed as being absolutely illegal, and ask for return of the documents seized. In Petition No. 372 of 1953 there are four petitioners of whom the second is the Delhi Glass Works Ltd. and the first the Deputy-General Manager thereof the third its Secretary and the fourth a share-holder therein. In Petition No. 375 of 1953 there are five petitioners of whom the first is Messrs Allen Berry and Co. Ltd., second Asia Udyog Ltd., the third Shri R. K. Dalmia, the fourth the Secretary and General Attorney of the third and the fifth a share-holder of Petitioners. Nos. 1 and 2, and an officer of petitioner No. 2. It will be seen that the petitioners in both the petitions belong to the four concerns, namely, (1) Delhi Glass Works Ltd. (2) Messrs Allen Berry and Co. Ltd., (3) Asia Udyog Ltd., and (4) Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. The last three are stated to be Dalmia concerns but it does not appear from the records placed before us what exact connection Delhi Glass Works Ltd. has with them. However, it is admittedly one of the places for which a search warrant was asked for and against which the First Information Report appears to have been lodged. In the petition various questions were raised. But such of them which raise only irregularities and illegalities of the searches and do not involve any constitutional violation are matters which may be more appropriately canvassed before the High Court on applications under Article 226 of the Constitution and we have declined to go into them. The petitioners have, therefore, confined themselves before us to two grounds on which they challenge the constitutional validity of the searches. The contentions raised are that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 20(3) and Art. 19(1)(f) have been violated by the searches in question.
(2.) So far as the contention based on Art. 19(1)(f) is concerned, we are unable to see that the petitioners have any arguable case. Article 19(1)(f) declares the right of all citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property subject to the operation of any existing or future law in so far as it imposes reasonable restrictions, on the exercise of any of the rights conferred thereby, in the interest of general public. It is urged that the searches and seizures as effected in this case were unreasonable and constitute a serious restriction on the right of the various petitioner, inasmuch as their buildings were invaded, their documents taken away and their business and reputation affected by these large-scale and allegedly arbitrary searches and that a law (S. 96(1), Criminal P.C.) which authorises such searches violates the constitutional guarantee and is invalid. But, a search by itself is not a restriction on the right to hold and enjoy property. No doubt a seizure and carrying away is a restriction of the possession and enjoyment of the property seized. This, however, is only temporary and for the limited purpose of investigation. A search and seizure is, therefore, only a temporary interference with the right to hold the premises searched and the articles seized. Statutory regulation in this behalf is a necessary and reasonable restriction and cannot 'per se' be considered to be unconstitutional the damage, if any, caused by such temporary interference if found to be in excess of legal authority is a matter for redress in other proceedings. We are unable to see how any question of violation of Art. 19(1)(f) is involved in this case in respect of the warrants in question which purport to be under the first alternative of S. 96(1) of the Criminal P.C.
(3.) The only substantial question, therefore, that has been raised is the one relating to Art. 20(3) which runs as follows: "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The argument urged before us is that a search to obtain documents, for investigation into an offence is a compulsory procuring of incriminatory evidence from the accused himself and is, therefore, hit by Art. 20(3) as unconstitutional and illegal. It is not disputed that 'prima facie' the Article in question has nothing to indicate that it comprehends within its scope, the prohibition of searches and seizures of documents from the custody of an accused. But it is urged that this is necessarily implied therein by certain canons of liberal construction which are applicable to the interpretation of constitutional guarantees. In support of this line of argument great reliance has been placed upon American decisions in which similar questions were canvassed. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is presented in the following way. The fundamental guarantee in Art. 20(3) comprehends within its scope not merely oral testimony given by an accused in a criminal case pending against him, but also evidence of whatever character compelled out of a person who is or is likely to become incriminated thereby as an accused. It, therefore, extends not only to compelled production of documents by an accused from his possession, but also to such compelled production of oral or documentary evidence from any other person who may become incriminated thereby as an accused in future proceedings. If this view of the content of Art. 20(3) is accepted, the next step in the argument presented is that a forcible search and seizure of documents is, for purposes of constitutional protection of this guarantee, on the same footing as a compelled production of the said documents by the person form whom they are seized this chain of reasoning, if accepted in its entirety, would render searches and seizures of documents and any statutory provisions in that behalf illegal and void as being in violation of the fundamental right under Art. 20(3) . The question thus raised is of far-reaching importance and requires careful consideration.;