Mehr Chand Mahajan, C. J. - (1.) This is an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment in Criminal Revision No. 981 of 1950 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad quashing the proceedings taken against the respondents under Section 120-B, I.P.C. read with Rules 81(4) and 121 of the Defence of India Rules and ordering their discharge.
(2.) It was alleged by the prosecution that the respondents infringed the provisions of Section 2 of the Non-Ferrous Metal Control Order, 1942, during the years 1943-1945 and thus committed an offence punishable under the above provisions of the law. No prosecution however was commenced against them till the 16th January 1950 in spite of the fact that a complaint against them had been made to the police in August 1948. There is no satisfactory explanation for this long delay in putting the chalan in Court and for the leisurely conduct of the investigation which concerned the provisions of an Act which it was known to all concerned had an uncertain life. It is a matter of regret that offences of a serious character should go unpunished simply because of the dilatory methods of the investigation agency.
(3.) On the 19th April 1950 the respondents made an application before the trial magistrate for quashing the proceedings commenced on the 16th January 1950 on the ground that the trial could not be continued because the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder had expired and because the Government of India Act, 1935 had also been repealed by the Constitution. The magistrate refused to quash these proceedings. The Judgment giving the reasons for this decision is by no means a specimen of clear thinking. The respondents filed an application in revision against this order in the Court of the Session Judge at Meerut, Mr. Maheshwary Dayal. This is now the learned Session Judge disposed of this matter: "The learned magistrate by means of a very elaborate and well reasoned judgment repelled this contention and held that the Defence of India Rules still subsisted and the offenders who committed breach of these rules were liable to prosecution. The magistrate's view is impeached in the present revision proceedings. But after going through arguments of the magistrate's judgment and considering the applicants' learned counsel and relevant legal provisions I found myself in agreement with the learned magistrate. The magistrate has taken very great pains over this case and has written an excellent judgment which should serve as a model to other magistrates and be a source of inspiration to them. I have not come across such an excellent judgment dealing with important questions of law written by a magistrate. I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to record elaborately my reasons for upholding the magistrate's view as it would be no more than reiteration of what the magistrate has already stated in his judgment. The magistrate's judgment should speak not only for the magistrate but for me also and I adopt his arguments and reasonings". The High Court very aptly remarked that the Sessions Judge refused to do anything himself in the matter and only contended himself by pouring encomia on the trial Court. The use made of superlatives by the Sessions Judge in praise of the judgment of the magistrate discloses that either he never understood what the magistrate had held or he failed to grasp the legal propositions that he had to tackle. The Sessions Judge clearly did not discharge his duty in this case.;