- (1.) These appeals and the special leave petition have been filed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation', which is constituted under the provisions of Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. The respondents in these matters were employees of the Corporation. Their services were terminated on charges of misconduct. They filed civil suits seeking declaration that the termination of their services was null and void and that they should be treated to be under employment of the Corporation. The orders of termination were assailed on the ground that the same had been passed in contravention of the standing orders framed by the Corporation under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act as well as Article 311 (2 of the Constitution. The said suits have been decreed by the courts below.
(2.) The question which has been raised by the Corporation is with regard to jurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain the suits. It has been urged that dispute between the Corporation and the respondent-employees whose services have been terminated was an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', and in view of the decision of this court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay' the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred and the only remedy available to the respondent-employee is that provided under the Act, viz. to have the dispute referred for adjudication to a labour court.
(3.) In the Premier Automobiles case (decided by a bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this court) , the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute have been stated thus: "(1 If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2 If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3 If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4 If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Ch. V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. We may, however, in relation to principle No. 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in Section 2-A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even 1976 I SCC 496: 1976 SCC (LAS) 70: 1976 I SCR 427 271 though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle No. 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle No. 3 stated above. ";