- (1.) This judgment-debtor's appeal is directed against judgment and order of the High court of Madras. The appellant was a defendant in a suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with her right as Hakdar and Pujari of two temples in Kottarakurichi village. The suit even though decreed by the trial court was dismissed by the first appellate court. But the decree of the trial court was restored by the High court, which was to the following effect: "The defendants, their workmen, their agent, etc. be and are hereby restrained by an order of permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of the plaint schedule property (described hereunder) till the end of 1965 Margali 30th (i. e. , till 13/01/1965 and in every alternative years in future. . "the judgment of the High court was delivered in 1969. The decree-holder died in June 1981. The respondent who claims to be adopted son of the plaintiff in the original suit and also her legatee filed an application for execution in 1981 under Section 146 and Order XXI Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was resisted by the appellant on various grounds. The application was allowed against which the appellant filed revision. During pendency of the execution proceedings, the respondent filed an application before the Deputy commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Tirunelveli, Tamilnadu, claiming the rights to do puja and enjoy the share of income from the two temples. The application was allowed by the Deputy Commissioner, but the order was set aside by the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable endowments, Madras in revision filed by the appellant. It was held that the respondent could not claim better and more rights than what were granted in favour of his predecessor-in-interest by the civil court. Against this order of the commissioner, the respondent filed a writ petition. Both, the revision filed by the appellant and writ petition filed by the respondent were decided by a common order. The High court maintained the order of the trial court in execution, except to certain extent. The writ petition filed by the respondent was dismissed.
(2.) The principal challenge to the order passed by the High court is on the nature of the decree. It is claimed that the decree being personal, it could not have been executed by the respondent who claimed to be successor-in-interest of the plaintiff in the suit. The submission appears to be devoid of any merit. In the main suit, out of which these execution proceedings have arisen, it was clearly held by the High court that the rights were heritable and partible. In view of this finding, it is not clear as to how can the appellant raise the argument of decree being personal in nature. Apart from that, the decree passed by the trial court, copy of which has been produced by the learned counsel for the respondent, the authenticity of which is not disputed by the appellant, and which has been extracted earlier, clearly indicates that the injunction granted did not impose any such restriction expressly nor could it be impliedly held that it lapsed with the death of the plaintiff.
(3.) It is then argued that the executing court committed an error of law in allowing the application of the respondent on the Will executed in his favour or the adoption deed filed by him without there being any adjudication in proper proceeding. This submission also is devoid of any merit as the High court has taken care of it and has clarified that the allowing of the application by the executing court would not preclude the appellant from challenging validity of these documents in appropriate proceedings. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.;