Thakkar, J. - (1.) A benevolent and justice-oriented decision of a three-judge Bench of this Court, rendered ten years back in a group of service matters, (D.P.O. Southern Railway v. T.R. Challappan), [1976-1 L.L.J. 68] is sought to be overruled by the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother Madon, J, with which, the majority appear to agree. "Challappan" having held the field for such a long time, it would have been appropriate if a meeting of the Judges constituting the Bench had been convened to seriously deliberate and evolve a consensus as to whether or not to overrule it. A 'give' and 'take' of ideas, with due respect for the holders of the opposite point of view (in a true democratic spirit of tolerance), with willingness to accord due consideration to the same, would not have impaired the search for the true solution, or hurt the cause of justice. The holders of the rival view points could have, perhaps, successfully persuaded and converted the holders of the opposite point of view, or got themselves persuaded and converted to the other point of view.
(2.) BROTHER Madon, J, to whom the judgment was assigned by the learned Chief Justice, also appears to suffer heart-ache on the same score, for, in his covering letter dated July 6, 1985 forwarding the first instalment of 142 pages he says: "......I regret to state that the draft judgment could not be sent to you earlier. The reason was that as we did not have a meeting to discuss this matter, I did not know what would be the view of my other BROTHERs on the large number of points which fall to be determined in these cases, except partly in the case of two of my BROTHERs with whom by chance I got an opportunity to discuss certain broad aspects......" If only there had been a meeting in order to have a dialogue, there might have been a meeting of minds, and we might have spoken in one voice. Failing which, the holders of the dissenting view point could have prepared their dissenting opinions. That was not to be. On the other hand, it has so transpired, that, the full draft judgment running into 237 pages has come to be circulated in the morning of July 11, 1985, less than 3 hours before the deadline for pronouncing the judgment. There is a time-compulsion to pronounce the judgment, on 11th July, 1985, as the learned Chief Justice who has presided over the Constitution Bench is due to retire on that day, and the judge-time invested by the five Judges would be wasted if it is not pronounced before his retirement. The Judge-time would be so wasted because the entire exercise would have to be done afresh. The neck-to-neck race against time and circumstances is so keen that it is impossible to prepare an elaborate judgment presenting the other point of view within hours and circulate the same amongst all the Judges constituting the Bench in this important matter which was heard for months, months ago. I am, therefore, adopting the only course open to me in undertaking the present exercise. 'Challappan' in my opinion, has been rightly decided. And there is no compulsion to overrule it Even if the other point of view were to appear to be more 'attractive', it is neither a good nor a sufficient ground to overrule 'Challappan'. After all what does 'Challappan' do? It does no more than enjoin in the context of Rule 14 (1) (a) and therefore, as a logical corollary, also in the context of Rule 14 (a) (b) - of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, that an employee must at least be heard on the question of quantum of punishment before he is dismissed or removed from service without holding any inquiry. The ratio of the decision is so innocuous that there is hardly any need to overturn it. Apart from the weighty reasons articulated by the three-Judge Bench, there are some more which can be called into aid. But while the 'will' is very much there, not the 'time', to elaborate the reasons to buttress 'Challappan' and to counter the criticism levelled against the thesis propounded therein. Or to expound my point of view in regard to propositions in respect of which I have reservations. I propose to do so later if deemed necessary. For the present, therefore, suffice it to say, I am unable to persuade myself to fall in line with the majority in overruling 'Challappan' and unable to concur with the consequential orders being passed in that context. I am also unable to associate myself with the exposition of law in regard to the true meaning and content of the 'pleasure doctrine' and its implications and impact.
(3.) THE sphere in which I am able to agree with the proposed judgment is in regard to the matters arising out of orders passed in exercise of powers under Art 311(2) (c) of the Constitution of India and the orders proposed to be passed therein. In the result: Following the law laid down in 'Challappan' the undermentioned appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs: Civil Appeal No. 6814 of 1983 Union of India and Anr. Vs. Tulsiram Patel Civil Appeal No. 3484 of 1982 Union of India and Ors. Vs. Sadanand Jha and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 3512 of 1982 Union of India and Ors. Vs. G.P. Koushal II;