Khanna, J. - (1.) On behalf of himself and Ray C. J., Alagiriswami and Bhagwati JJ.). This judgment would dispose of civil appeals No. 1730 and 1751, 1752 and 1753 of 1967 which have been filed on certificate by the State of Punjab against a Full Bench judgment of the Punjab High Court whereby Section 2 of the East Punjab Movable Property (Requisitioning) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was struck down on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further held that Section 2 was not severable from the rest of the Act and the other provisions of the Act were merely ancillary to the powers of requisitioning and acquisition of property contained in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. The High Court accordingly held the entire Act to be unconstitutional and void.
(2.) We may set out the facts giving rise to civil appeal No. 1730, because it is the common case of the parties that the decision in that appeal would govern the other three appeal also. The respondent in civil appeal No. 1730 is the owner of Tata Mercedes Benze truck No. 1607. On December 18, 1964 the District Magistrate Rohtak passed an order under Section 2 of the Act requiring Khan Chand respondent to place the above truck at the disposal of the Executive Engineer Rohtak because the District Magistrate was of the view that trucks were necessary to carry road material for famine work. It was also mentioned that compensation for the use of the truck would be paid at the rate fixed by the Government. The truck was thereafter taken into possession by the District Magistrate on December 19, 1964. The respondent thereupon filed petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court challenging the validity of the above order of the District Magistrate. Prayer was also made to declare the provisions of the Act to be unconstitutional.
(3.) The petition was resisted by the State of Punjab and the District Magistrate of Rohtak, who are the appellants before us, and the affidavit of the District Magistrate was filed in opposition to the petition. The petition was first posted for hearing before a single Judge who referred it to a Division Bench. The Division Bench, in view of the importance of the matter; referred it to Full Bench. The Full Bench examined the different provisions of the Act and found that Section 2 of the Act was violative or Article 14 of the Constitution as it gave unfettered and unguided power to the executive to interfere with the property rights of the citizens in an arbitrary manner. It was observed that the Act did not lay down any principle or policy for guidance in the exercise of the wide discretion conferred by it on the executive authorities. Section 2 of the Act was accordingly, as observed earlier, held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As regards Section 3 of the Act, it was observed that it could not come into operation without Section 2 being first invoked. The other provisions of the Act were held to be merely ancillary to the powers of requisitioning and acquisition of property contained in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. As the Act was found to confer on the Government arbitrary and uncontrolled power to discriminate both between things and persons and as the discrimination was writ large on the face of the Act, the entire Act was held to the unconstitutional and void.;