JUDGEMENT
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(1.) This is an appeal against the judgment of the Judicial Commr. of Vindhya Pradesh dated 10-3-1951 by leave granted under Art..134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The first and the second appellants were at the material period of time respectively the Minister for Industries and the Secretary to the Government, Commerce and Industries Department of the then United State of Vindhya Pradesh. The case for the prosecution against them is as follows:
In the State of Panna (one of the component units of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh) there are certain diamond mines. By an agreement dated 1-8-1936 between the Panna Durbar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a period of 15 years. It appears that on or about 31-10-1947 the Panna Durbar directed the stoppage of the mining work on the ground that the Syndicate was not carrying on the operations properly. Since then the Syndicate was making strenuous efforts to obtain cancellation of the said order. It is alleged that the two appellants in the course of these attempts, with which, at the material time, they were concerned in their official capacity, entered into a conspiracy about the beginning of February 1949 at Rewa (within the United State of Vindhya Pradesh), to obtain illegal gratification for the purpose of revoking the previous order of stoppage of mining work. In pursuance of the said conspiracy it is alleged that the second appellant demanded on 8-3-1949 at Rewa illegal gratification from one Nagindas Mehta, a representative of the Panna Diamond Minning Syndicate, and that later on, on 11-4-1949 the first appellant, in fact, received a sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards it at the Constitution House in New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be orders passed in official capacity and intended to confer some advantages or benefits on the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate.
(2.) On these allegations the two appellants were charged for criminal conspiracy and for taking of illegal gratification by a public servant for doing an official act and for the commission of forgery in connection therewith. The charges were under Ss. 120-B,161, 465 and 466, I. P. C., as adapted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 48 of 1949, and the trial was held by a special Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. 5 of 1949. At the trial both the appellants were acquitted. The State filed an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner against the same whereupon both were convicted under Ss. 120-B and 161, I.P.C. (as adapted). In addition, the first appellant was convicted under Ss. 465 and 466, I. P. C. (as adapted). He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and to a fine of Rs. 2,000 under S.120-B and to rigorous imprisonment for three years under S. 161 I. P. C., the two sentences to run concurrently in respect of his conviction under Ss. 465 and 466 no separate sentence was awarded. The second appellant was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under S. 120-B, but under S. 161 no separate sentence was awarded. The validity of the convictions and sentences has been challenged on the ground that there has been infringement of Arts. 14 and 20 of the Constitution.
(3.) In addition, a further point has been raised before us by leave that no appeal lay to the Judicial commissioner from the acquittal by the special Judge. It is convenient to deal with this point in the first instance. The question raised depends on a construction of the provisions of the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. 5 of 1949 dated 2-12-1949. By S. 2 thereof the Vindhya Pradesh Government was given the power by notification to constitute special courts of criminal jurisdiction within the State and by S. 3 to appoint a special Judge to preside over the special court. By S. 4 the Government was authorised to issue notifications from time to time allotting cases for trial by the special Judge in respect of charges for offences specified in the Schedule to the Ordinance. Sections 5(1), 7 and 8 provide certain departures from the normal procedure or evidence, and S. 9 provides for special punishment. Section 5, sub-s. (2) provides as follows:
"Save as provided in sub-s. (1) the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Ordinance, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court, and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court or Session trying cases without a Jury or without the aid of Assessors, and a person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor."
Section 6 provides as follows:
"The High Court may, subject to the provisions of S. 7 regarding transfer of cases, exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters 31 and 32, Criminal P.C., as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, on a High Court as if the Court of the Special Judge were a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury within the local limits of the High Court's jurisdictions.";
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