- (1.) Very briefly stated facts leading to this application are that for development of Noida, lands belonging to the applicant Society and its members, were acquired. The State Government formulated a policy to allot some developed plot to the members of the Society. As disputes arose during the implementation of that policy, Writ Petition was filed in the Allahabad High Court. Against orders in that Writ Petition a Civil Appeal was filed in this court.
(2.) By an order dated 3rd of May, 1990, certain directions were issued on the basis of a consensus arrived at between the parties. It was agreed and so recorded that allotments be made either in Sectors 40, 41 or 42 and if sufficient number of plots were not available in these sectors then in adjoining sectors. The plots were to be developed by Noida within a period of nine months and the price of the plot was to be at the rate of Rs.1000/- per sq. meter.
(3.) It appears that 242 members could not be accommodated. Again this court was approached. On 4th April, 1991, statement of counsel for NOIDA was recorded and following order passed: "As against this suggestion made by the society, counsel for NOIDA states that pursuant to the judgment rendered by this Court in Hiralal Chawlas case (1990) 2 SCC 149 the surplus 9.68 acres would revert to NOIDA and therefore the society cannot be permitted to utilise that land in the name of accommodating 242 members. Learned counsel for NOIDA, however, fairly states that if the said 242 members belong to the lower income groups NOIDA would be willing as a special case to prepare a housing scheme for them and accommodate them in the surplus 9.68 acres of land or the such lesser area as may be required having regard to the total out of such members desiring to have residential accommodation there. He also stated that NOIDA itself would be able to arrange loans for such persons at low rate of interest and would ensure that the payment of instalment is arranged keeping in mind their financial capacity to pay. This, says counsel for NOIDA would be in keeping with the decision of this Court in Hiralal Chawlas case (supra). The anxiety of all concerned is therefore to ensure residential accommodation to the left out 242 members of the petitioner society who could not make the payments on the due date on account of their financial incapacity. If this anxiety is met by NOIDA, we do not see any reason why NOIDA itself member of such of them as would desire to be accommodated on such part of the remaining land admeasuring 9.68 acres which would revert to NOIDA in terms of this courts aforesaid judgment. The names of such members who were members on the cut off date i.e. 1st May, 1986 may be furnished by the petitioner society within four weeks from today. After the names are so furnished it will be for NOIDA to ascertain how many out of them desire to be accommodated under the housing scheme floated by it. After ascertaining the same NOIDA will determine the extent of land which would be required for the scheme to accommodate those who desire to be accommodated. If on that basis the entire area of 9.68 acres of land is not required to be utilised, the surplus land will remain with NOIDA to be utilised in such manner as it deems proper. NOIDA will after ascertain from the 242 members their wishes in regard to being accommodated float a scheme within two months from the date when it has received the replies from the 242 members and thereafter proceed to raise the construction as early as possible. We may make it clear that it was in the special circumstances of this case and having regard to the manifold increase in the price of land that the 242 members were unable to meet their increased financial obligation having regard to their financial limitations. We feel inclined to think that it was unfair to deprive such members of an opportunity to secure their own residential accommodation because of the intervening circumstances, particularly the manifold rise in the land price. It was for this reason that we impressed upon the learned counsel for NOIDA to take a liberal view. Despite his initial hesitation and reluctance he was good enough to consult his officers and to treat this as a special case having regard to the peculiar developments. His initial hesitation or reluctance was only because he was afraid that this may be cited as a precedent in future. His apprehension was dispelled when he saw the justness of the matter in the special and peculiar circumstances mentioned earlier. With the above direction IA No.of 1980 is disposed of." ;