- (1.) The order dated 15-3-1996 passed by the High Court is under challenge in these appeals. The facts, which are relevant and necessary for the disposal of these appeals, in short, are the following: The appellant as well as the respondents applied for grant of occupancy rights in respect of certain lands under Section 5 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"). The Tahsildar, after holding the inquiry in the light of the claims made by the parties, concluded that both the parties have equal shares in the lands attached to the village office and he regranted the occupancy rights in favour of the parties by specifying certain lands in favour of the appellant and certain lands in favour of the respondents. The respondents herein, not being satisfied with the order passed by the Tahsildar, preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, which was dismissed affirming the order passed by the Tahsildar. The respondents took up the matter in revision before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned order, found fault with the order passed by the Tahsildar holding that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act to effect partition in the lands over which occupancy rights were granted to both the parties. It, however, gave liberty to the appellant to work out her remedies in the civil court as regards her share in the property. Hence, this appeal.
(2.) The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court did not correctly read the order of the Tahsildar; the Tahsildar did not effect partition in the lands in question but he only granted occupancy rights in favour of both the parties, having regard to the possession and enjoyment over the lands, perhaps for the sake of convenience. The learned counsel also pointed to the definition of the "holder of a village office" or "holder" contained in Section 2(g) of the Act in support of his argument that by virtue of the proviso to Section 2(g), the appellant, being a member of whole body of persons having interest in the village office and her name having been found in the relevant register, was also entitled to the grant of occupancy rights under Section 5 of the Act. He added that if the impugned order is sustained, it may amount to holding that the appellant had no right for regrant and if she has any right, she could work out her remedies in the civil court. He drew our attention to the operative portion of the order passed by the Tahsildar wherein it is clearly stated that both the parties are entitled to the grant of occupancy rights, which order was also affirmed by the Appellate Authority.
(3.) Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents made an attempt to say that the appellant was not at all entitled to the grant of occupancy rights; it is only the respondents who were entitled to under Section 5 of the Act. He submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court is quite in order and it is sustainable.;