- (1.) This appeal is filed against the Judgement and order dated 11-9-2001 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT for short), South Zonal Bench at Chennai in Appeal No. E/R-331 of 1997. That appeal was filed by the Revenue against the order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai on the grounds that from the available records, it was noticed that respondent M/s Kartik Steels Limited in their letter dated 19-1-1994 had informed that they were engaged in manufacture of steel and alloy steel castings from February 1982; that the metal constituents used in the manufacture of the said castings are carbon, nickel, manganese, sulphur, phosphorus, silicon, chromium, columbium, titanium, molybdenum, copper and vanadium; that 75% of their production is without nickel and chromium and the balance 25% production would be with nickel and chromium. It was also submitted that the respondent were manufacturing and clearing the goods in question for which they have not filed any classification list for the goods where chromium predominates other than metals which were classifiable under Heading 8112.00 and continued to clear the manufactured articles under Heading 7325.00.
(2.) Considering the facts, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the Commissioner before dropping the show-cause notice has gone into the factual position and has correctly held that the classification list has been approved finally and the RT 12 assessments were also finalised and if they had any doubt about the nature of goods, it was for the Department to have taken any representative sample and sent it to the Chemical Examiner for test, before approving the classification list. Therefore the Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Commissioner and the same was confirmed. The Tribunal therefore dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. That order is challenged in this appeal.
(3.) From the facts it is clear that the Commissioner after taking into consideration all the facts has arrived at the conclusion that there was no question of suppression on the part of the respondent and, therefore, provisions of Section 11-A for invoking extended period of limitation were not applicable.;