Y. K. Sabharwal, J. - (1.) The appellant directed the respondents and few other workmen to cease work w.e.f. 31st March, 1987. According to the appellant, they were casual workers and had worked for a short time and since there was no work, they were asked to cease work and their services were, thus, terminated. The workmen approached the State Government of Uttar Pradesh against their termination and pursuant thereto, the State Government, in exercise of power under S. 4(k) of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the U. P. Act) referred the matter to the Labour Court of Lucknow to decide the dispute. It was not disputed before the Labour Court that none of the workmen had worked for 240 days in the year preceding the date of termination. In this view, the Labour Court, in the award dated 31st May, 1991, concluded that the workmen/respondents were not entitled to protection of S. 6-N of the UP Act. According to Labour Court, the workmen ought to have completed 240 days in a calendar year preceding the date of termination/retrenchment so as to claim benefit of S. 6-N of the U. P. Act. Considering the evidence, the Labour Court also held that all the 29 workmen had worked for more than 240 days in each year during the past years prior to 1986. The effect of the finding recorded by the Labour Court is that the workmen have worked for more than 240 days from the year 1983 to 1986 but they having not worked for 240 days from 1st April, 1986 to 31st March, 1987, they were not entitled to protection and benefit of the continuous service under the UP Act. On appreciation of evidence, the finding recorded by the Labour Court is as follows :"In these circumstances, I arrive to the conclusion that the employer have failed to dispute the evidence of the workmen that all the 29 workmen had worked for more than 240 days in each year during the past years prior to 1986. In other words, I reached to the conclusion that although these workman have not completed 240 days of service in a year preceding the date of their termination but have worked for more than 240 days in each year prior to that after joining the service."
(2.) Out of 29 workmen before the Labour Court, the award was challenged by 18 workmen in a writ petition filed in the High Court. The said workmen are respondents in this appeal. By the impugned judgment, the High Court, setting aside the award, has held that under S. 6-N read with S. 2(g) of the UP Act, it is not necessary for the workmen to complete 240 days in the preceding year and since workmen had completed 240 days in earlier calendar years preceding to 12 months on the date of retrenchment, they were deemed to be in a continuous service and hence their termination in violation of S. 6-N of the UP Act was illegal. The respondents have been held to be in continuous service. The High Court has directed that they shall be given consequential service benefits including reinstatement except the backwages. The appellant has been directed to pay the wages to the respondents from the date of reinstatement.
(3.) Assailing the impugned judgment, it has been contended that for applicability of S. 6-N read with S. 2(g) of the UP Act, it is essential for a workman to complete 240 days in preceding 12 calendar months. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the respondents having worked for 240 days or more during the period earlier to 12 calendar months is inconsequential. The undisputed fact is that the respondents whose services were terminated w.e.f. 31st March, 1987, did not actually work for 240 days for the period from 1st April, 1986 to 31st March, 1987. The finding of the Labour Court, however, is that for earlier years, they did work for more than 240 days. What is the consequence of this finding is the question. The correctness of the impugned judgment is required to be examined on these facts. We may note that the respondents have also challenged the impugned judgment in so far as it declines payment of back wages to them. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned advocate appearing for the respondents, supporting the impugned judgment on the aspect of interpretation of Ss. 6-N and 2(g), contends that if the contention propounded by the management is accepted, it will provide a handle of abuse in the hands of the management.;