BHARUCHA - (1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Additional Judge, Rohtak, being the Designated court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short TADA Act, 1987') whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence punishable under S. 5 thereof and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 200.00 or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months.
(2.) THE appellant was apprehended by Sub-Inspector Rohtas Singh and Head Constable Ram Krishan near the Hilton factory on G.T. Road in the State of Haryana on 7/04/1988 on suspicion. In the envelope of wax paper that the appellant was carrying was found a .12 bore country- made pistol for which he had no licence or permit. After the necessary formalities, sanction was issued on 26/04/1988 by the District Magistrate, Sonepat, for prosecuting the appellant for an offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. On 7/12/1989, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sonepat, before whom the appellant was being prosecuted for the said offence, passed the following order: "Present A.P.P. for the State. Accused on bail. At this stage it has come to my notice that this case should have been tried by the learned Designated court under S. 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Con- sequently this case is sent to learned Designated court (Shri B.R. Gupta learned Additional Sessions Judge), Sonepat. Accused is directed to appear in that court at 12.00 noon today itself. File completed in all respects. Be sent immediately. Sd/- J.M.I.C. Sonepat Announced 7/12/1989." The appellant was then tried by the said Additional Judge under Section 5 of the TADA Act, 1987. The judgment under appeal noted that the appellant was charged on 18/12/1989 by the said Addi- tional Judge for the offence punishable under S. 5 of the TADA Act, 1987, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. Upon the evidence led, the said Additional Judge found that the prosecution had brought home the offence to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. According- ly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The appellant has in his grounds of appeal taken, inter alia, the plea that the prosecution itself had not considered the case against him to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed under the TADA Act, 1987 and that it was, therefore, not proper that he should have been tried and convicted thereunder. In the counter filed by Khajan Singh, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Rai, it is submitted in reply that the prosecution had considered this to be a fit case to frame a charge and proceed against the appellant under S. 5 of the TADA Act, 1987 and had requested the learned Magistrate to transfer the case to the Designated court for trial.
(3.) IT is not in dispute that the provisions of the TADA Act, 1987 had been extended to cover the whole of the State of Haryana by a notification dated 18/11/1987. This court in the judgment in Jaloba v. State of Haryana considered the submission that the Designated court had no jurisdiction to try the appellant Jaloba because he had not been charged with having committed 665 any offence under the TADA Act, 1985. He had been charged under S. 25 of the Arms Act. This court rejected the submission noting S. 6 and 9 of the TADA Act, 1985 (equivalent to S. 5 and II of the TADA Act, 1987. S. 6 laid down that if in any area notified by the State government under the TADA Act, 1985, a person contravened any provision or rule made, inter alia, under the Arms Act, then he was liable to the enhanced punishment provided for in the section. S. 9 of the TADA Act, 1985 laid down that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, every offence punishable under that Act or a rule made thereunder was triable only by the Designated court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It, therefore, followed that though the offence committed by the appellant was in contravention of S. 25 of the Arms Act, it became exclusively triable by the Designated court because of the notification made by the State government and the operation of S. 6 of the TADA Act, 1985. It was, therefore, futile for the appellant to contend that the Designated court did not have jurisdiction to try him for the offence for which he stood charged.;