Mitter, J. - (1.) The only question involved in this appeal is, whether the order dated September 25, 1968 terminating the services of the respondent, a temporary Government servant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules 1965, hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'.
(2.) The services of the Respondent appear to have been terminated on the basis of the directive contained in a circular dated 12th September 1968 that action should be taken against every employee who absented himself from duty on 19th September 1968. No contention was raised at any stage that no action could be taken under Rule 5. The said rule reads:- "5. Termination of temporary service. - (1) (a) The services of temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant; (b) the period of such notice shall be one month; Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. ********** " It is admitted that payment of the salary and allowances was not made to the respondent on 25th September, 1968. According to the respondent the disbursing officer was intimated about the order of termination only on the 28th September when he was supplied with the necessary funds. As against this it was alleged in the counter affidavit to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court that one month's pay and allowances had been sent by money order to the respondent. The question is, whether the order of termination of absence of payment on the 25th September. The order was quashed by a learned single Judge of the High Court and this was upheld by a Division Bench in appeal.
(3.) Apart from the authorities which were cited at the Bar, it appears to us that the rule is capable of the only interpretation that the order of termination can be upheld if the requisite amount in terms of the rule was paid into the hands of the employee or made available to him at the same time as he was served with the order. Rule 5 (1) (a) gives the Government as well as the employee a right to put an end to the service by a notice in writing. Under Rule 1 (b) the period prescribed for such notice is one month. The proviso to sub-rule (b) however gives the Government an additional right in that it gives an option to the Government not to retain the service of the employee till the expiry of the period of the notice; if it so chooses to terminate the service at any time it can do so forthwith "by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month." At the risk of repetition, we may note that the operative words of the proviso are "the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment". To put the matter in a nutshell, to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment to the employee of the whatever is due to him. We need not pause to consider the question as to what would be the effect if there was a bona fide mistake as to the amount which is to be paid. The rule does not lend itself to the interpretation that the termination of service becomes effective as soon as the order is served on the Government servant, irrespective of the question as to when the payment due to him is to be made. If that was the intention of the framers of the rules, the proviso would have been differently worded. As has often been said that if "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense." "and not to limit plaint words in an Act of Parliament by considerations of policy if it be policy, as to which minds may differ and as to which decisions may vary," ........ see Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition Pages 86 and 92.;