BALLARPUR COLLIERIES CO Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER C G I T DHANBAD
LAWS(SC)-1972-3-8
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: PATNA)
Decided on March 14,1972

BALLARPUR COLLIERIES COMPANY Appellant
VERSUS
PRESIDING OFFICER,C.G.I.T.,DHANBAD Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Facts giving rise to this appeal by special leave may briefly be stated: On May 18, 1956 an award was made by Shri Majumdar, which is popularly known as the Majumdar Award. On May 23, 1960 the Central Government, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) referred to Shri G. Palit, Chairman, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad the question "Whether 'traffic' is to be placed in Grade II of the clerical service in terms of the said Award" the award being the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3 dated the 26th May, 1956. (S. R. O. No. 1224 dated 18-5-56). "Traffics' are a category of clerical staff covered by the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes), popularly known as the 'Majumdar Award', and it appears that in the opinion of the Government a difficulty or doubt had arisen with regard to the interpretation of the provisions of the said award in so far as it related to the scale of pay etc. for "Traffics' and accordingly, the question had been referred for interpretation to the Dhanbad Central Government Industrial Tribunal, then presided over by Shri G. Palit. This order of the Central Government gave rise to Reference No. 27 of 1960". During the course of the hearing of this reference some colliery owners, including the appellant Ballarpur Collieries Co., which is a private partnership, in whose collieries there were, no workmen with the designation of "Traffic" wanted to be excluded from the reference altogether on the ground that they were not interested in the dispute pending before the Tribunal presided over by Shri Palit. The appellant presented an application in August, 1960 stating: "So far as the petitioner is concerned this dispute does not concern these collieries because they have not got any traffic in employees coming under this category. As such the presence of the petitioner before this Tribunal is not necessary." It appears that the Tribunal did not record any express order either permitting the appellant to withdraw from the dispute or declining such permission. The appellant, however, did not take part in the proceedings thereafter and the workers of the appellant's colliery also did not take any steps to participate therein. In the Award given by Shri Palit known as Palit's Award which was published in the Gazette of India on November 22 1960, it is not disputed that the case of those collieries as well, including the appellant's colliery at Ballarpur where the workmen described as "Traffic" did not exist for the time being was dealt with. Reference to the application presented by the appellant and other colliery owners was made in the Award in the following terms: "Then with reference to the contention of some of the collieries that where the workmen designated as 'traffic' do not occur, their names should be omitted from the present reference under Section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But this section has been wrongly invoked here. In the present case I have not summoned them in pursuance of the said section. So the question does not arise whether they were so summoned without proper cause. They have been summoned in the present case because they were parties to the original award. I have to summon all the parties who were impleaded in the original coal Award. So this contention is overruled. In an omnibus or industrywise reference it is not necessary that the dispute must relate to each one of them or the cause of action must exist in all cases. Even if the dispute is not there but they are made parties in the reference, all that may be said is that they are under no obligation to implement the Award. But the award will be binding on all of them all the same. So I am unable to exclude them." During the pendency of the proceedings before Shri Palit the workers of the appellant's colliery went on strike from October, 4, 1960, the cause for the strike being dismissal of six workmen. No notice was given of the strike though, according to the judgment of the High Court under appeal under Standing Order No. 32 of the Standing Orders approved by the Statutory Authority, the workmen were bound to give 14 days' notice before going on strike. The appellant, therefore, filed an application, before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), on October 31, 1960, in pursuance of Paragraph 8 (1) of the Coal Mines Bonus Scheme for a declaration that the strike was illegal. The Regional Commissioner, however, held the strike to be legal with the result that the appellant preferred an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal under Paragraph 8 (4) of the said Scheme. This appeal failed and the appellant approached the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition assailing the legality of the strike. The following three points were raised by the appellant in challenging the strike before the High Court :- (1) The strike took place during the pendency of Reference No. 27 of 1960 before Shri Palit, and consequently Clause (d) of Section 23 would apply. (2) The strike took place during the pendency of the settlement effected by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Bombay, while settling the dispute which arose out of the strike in January/February, 1960 and consequently Clause (c) of Section 23 of the Act would apply. (3) In any view of the case, as the labourers resorted to strike without giving due notice as required by Standing Order No. 32, the strike was in breach of a contract between the employer and its workmen and was, therefore, illegal. The High Court did not agree with the appellant's contentions and dismissed the writ petition.
(2.) Before us the same three points were raised by Shri Phadke, learned counsel for the appellant. The third point was very fairly not pressed by Shri Phadke because mere breach of a Standing Order could not render the strike illegal under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Only the first two points were pressed. In so far as Section 23 (c) is concerned Shri Phadke made a reference to the settlement, a copy of which was annexed with the writ petition in the High Court. It appears that the workers of the appellant's colliery had gone on strike in the months of January/February, 1960 and efforts of the management had failed to persuade the workers to resume duty. The Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bombay, thereupon wrote a D. O. letter dated February 4, 1960 to Shri Haldulkar, President of the Workers' Union in reply to the said President's telegram of the same date in which the Labour Commissioner had stated that he was going to visit Nagpur on February 9, 1960 and would look into the matter. The Regional Labour Commissioner had in that letter requested Shri Haldulkar to make it convenient to see him at the office of the Conciliation Officer at Nagpur. The Regional Labour Commissioner then used his good offices in getting the matter resolved as a result of which the workers resumed their duty and got their dues etc., from the management. The report of what transpired at the time of the visit of the Regional Labour Commissioner was recorded in "annexure D", annexed to the writ petition filed in the High Court. It appears from "annexure D" that after discussing the matter with the appellant and the workmen, the Regional Labour Commissioner induced both sides to adopt a reasonable attitude and the strike was called off. The relevant portion of annexure D may here be reproduced: "..... ..... ..... It was on 10th February, 1960, that I visited Chanda and had talks with Shri Zallaram, Vice President of the Union and other important workers of the Colliery. A representative of the management Shri S. V. Kanade, Personnel Officer was also present at the time of discussion. I impressed upon the Union Officials and the workers that going on strike would not solve their problems but would on the other hand create complications and bitter relations between the Management and the workers. I also emphasised upon the Management that they should also see that the grievances of the workers were not allowed to accumulate and full justice was given to them. Considerable discussions continued on this issue and I asked the Union Officials that they would withdraw the strike immediately so that the relations between workers and management could be restored to normalcy ... ... ... The Union thereupon stated that owing to the strike the workers were likely to lose their bonus and continuity of service for purposes of annual leave. I told them that I would take up the matter with the management provided they call off the strike first to which they agree. I was also assured that they would see that such strikes are not resorted to in future and would adopt all constitutional means to get their grievances redressed. I saw Shri Jamnadas Daga, this morning on my return from Chanda and informed him of the discussion which had transpired at Chanda. He agreed to consider the matter favourably; when I informed him that the workers had already agreed to call off the strike on the 10th February, 1960 the Management agreed to the following: (i) that the 3 suspended workers would be allowed to join their duties within a period of 24 hours to 48 hours and possibly within 24 hours after the resumption of work. (ii) that the workers will not be deprived of the Annual leave under the Mines Act 52 with wages on account of this stoppage of Work if they are otherwise eligible. (iii) that although the strikers are not entitled to bonus, as a special case, which will not form a precedent, the Management has agreed to reduce the qualifying period from 65 to 60 attendances to 50 and 45 attendances in the quarter ending March, 1960 only. As regards the amount of bonus it would be calculated at one-sixth of the earned basic wage instead of one-third normally paid under the Bonus Scheme. (iv) workers who have left the colliery for their homes, would be allowed to join their duties within a period of 15 days from the resumption of work." According to Shri Phadke this report embodies a settlement between the appellant and the workmen and the assurance given by the workmen not to resort to strike but to adopt constitutional means for getting their grievances redressed being one of the matters covered by the settlement, S. 23 (c) of the Act was attracted rendering the strike illegal.
(3.) Let us see if S. 23 supports this submission. That section reads: "23. General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs: No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out - (a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; (b) during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings; (bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of section 10A; or (c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award.' In support of his contention Shri Phadke relied upon a recent decision of this Court in Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. Management of Motor Industries Co. Ltd., Bangalore, (1970) 1 SCR 304 = (AIR 1969 SC 1280), specific reliance being placed on the following passage at pp. 310-311: "Read in the context of the other provisions of Part I of the settlement of which it is part, cl. 5 was intended to prohibit (a) direct action without notice by or at the instance of the association, and (b) strikes by workmen themselves without the approval of the association. The words 'in no case' used in the clause emphasise that direct action by either party without notice should not be resorted to for any reason whatsoever. There can be no doubt that the settlement was one as defined by S. 2 (p) of the Industrial Disputes Act and was binding on the workmen under S. 18 (3) of the Act until it was validly terminated and was in force when the said strike took place. The strike was a lightning one, was resorted to without notice and was not at the call of the association and was, therefore, in breach of cl. 5." In this judgment reference was also made to an earlier unreported decision of this Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. C. B. Mitter, C. A. No. 633 of 1963, D/- 2-4-1964 (SC) in support of the conclusion arrived at therein. In our opinion, it is difficult to hold that in the circumstances of the present case the assurance stated to have been given by the work-men to the Regional Labour Commissioner that they (the workmen) would see that they do not resort to such strikes in future and that they adopt all constitutional means to get their grievances redressed amounted to a term of the settlement, breach of which would attract cl. (c) of S. 23 of the Act. In order to be hit by S. 23 (c) the strike must be in breach of contract in respect of a matter covered by the settlement which is in operation at the time of the strike. The assurance referred to in the Regional Labour Commissioner's report neither amounts to a contract nor is it a matter covered by the aforesaid settlement. This contention, therefore, must fail.;


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