Shelat, J. - (1.) This is a petition sent to this Court by the petitioner from jail and treated as one under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of his detention under an order passed by the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas under Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 26 of 1971. The principal challenge to the petitioner's said detention is that the grounds of detention furnished to him at the time of his arrest are not relevant to the objects for which the Act permits preventive detention.
(2.) The two grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner, as aforesaid read as follows: "(1) On 12-8-71 at about 17.00 hours you and some of your associates being armed with bhojali, bomb, choppers etc. etc. kidnapped Kashinath Saha of West Putiary, P. S. Behala and killed him at K. M. Naskar Road, P. S. Jadavpur. You thereby created panic and terror in the locality and disturbed public order. (2) On 26-8- 71 at about 12.00 hours you and some of your associates being armed with bombs, daggers, choppers, pipe gune etc. dragged one Jyotirmay Bhattacharya and killed him at H. L. Sarkar Road, Bansdroni, P. S. Jadavpur. You thereby created panic and terror in the locality and disturbed public order."
(3.) Prima facie the grounds appear to affect two individuals who were the victims of the alleged two assaults, and therefore, do not appear to be relevant grounds affecting the maintenance of public order for which only the power of detention under the Act is intended to be used. Counsel for the State, however, relied on certain recent decisions of this Court justifying the exercise of power by the State of West Bengal under the Act. In Joydeb Gorai v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 2 SCC 417 ground No. (1) set out only a threat to kill one Bibhuti Bhusan Ghosh for his refusal to rub out certain anti-naxalite slogans on the wall of a house. The argument was that even such a threat to kill an individual was held in that case to be a relevant ground. It is, however, clear from that decision that that ground was held to be a relevant one as such an act fell within the special definition of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" in Sec. 3 (2) (d) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 19 of 1970. Similarly, the case of Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 498 was a case arising under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act. The grounds of detention there were that the petitioner there and his associates set fire to a school and its registers and equipments, placing a bomb in the school also with a view to scare away the members of the staff from putting out the fire. That ground was held to be a valid ground, jeopardising the maintenance of public order and falling under Sec. 3 (2) (d) of the said Act. In that decision a distinction was made between acts which by reason of their impact and potentiality affect the even tempo of the life of the people in the locality where they are committed and those which do not have such an impact and are acts which concern only specific individuals. As an example of the latter class, the case of Sudhir Kumar Saha v. The Commr. of Police, Calcutta, (1970) 1 SCC 149 amy aptly be recalled. That case was under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 which did not contain any special definition of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as in the President's Act 19 of 1970. The three incidents set out in the grounds of detention there were held to be stray incidents affecting law and order only which, as the Court stated there, could well be dealt with under the ordinary penal laws of the country. In Amiya Kumar Karmakar v. State of West Bengal, W. P. No. 190 of 1972, D/- 31-7-1972 the order of detention was passed under S. 3(1) and (2) of the present Act. In that case the detention order was challenged on the ground that one of the two grounds of detention was irrelevant inasmuch as the incident there referred to pertain to the question of law and order and not of public order. In dealing with the challenge, the Court referred to Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 and (1972) 1 SCC 498 to demonstrate that the true distinction between the areas of law and order and of public order lay not merely in the nature or quality of the Act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause, it was said, different reactions, in one case affecting specific individuals only and in others affecting public order. The act in question there, though prima facie affecting an individual, was held in the context and circumstances of the case to be one jeopardising or likely to jeopardise the maintenance of public order. A similar challenge was also repelled on similar grounds in Arun Kumar Sinha v. State of West Bengal, W. P. No. 117 of 1972, D/- 31-7-1972.;