- (1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, passed in Reference No. 5 of 1959 on February 11, 1960. The appellant is a Public limited Company incorporated under the Indian companies Act, 1913, and it carries on business in the manufacture and sale of electric cables, wires etc. Its registered office is at Calcutta and its factory is located at Jamshedpur. Before January 1, 1956, it had no branches and was selling its goods through Messrs Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co. , as its agents. During this period, a company incorporated in England and called the British Insulated callendars Cables Ltd. referred to as the B. I. C. C. Ltd. , in these proceedings was carrying on business in the sale of cables and wires in India with branches at Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Delhi, trivandrum, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Kanpur, Bangalore and Ambala. Towards the end of 1955, the b. I. O. C. Ltd. decided to stop its trading in India and to close its branches. The appellant Company then decided to take them over and run them as its own. The workmen in the service of the B. I. C. C. Ltd. were most of them offered re-employment on terms and conditions contained in a communication dated November 23, 1955, sent by the appellant to them, and they having accepted them the branches began to function as those of the appellant from january 1, 1956. Among the branches thus taken over was the one at Ambala. The business of that branch consisted, apart from the sale of goods manufactured by the appellant, in the execution of the contracts of the B. I. C. C. Ltd. , with the Government of Punjab, which it had taken over. These contracts were about to be completed in the beginning of 1958, and as, having regard to the volume of its own business in that area, the appellant considered that the maintenance of a branch at Ambala was unremunerative, it decided to close it. Accordingly on May 8, 1958, it terminated the services of all its workmen at Ambala, numbering 11 in all, paid them their salaries, wages in lieu of notice, retrenchment compensation, gratuity, and provident fund, and wound up the branch. According to the appellant, the workmen accepted these amounts without any protest and co-operated with the management in the despatch of its goods to Delhi and other places. It is the case of the workmen that they received the amounts under protest. But nothing, however, turns on this. On June 5, 1958, six of the workmen who had been discharged on may 8, 1958, sent a representation to the management complaining that the closure of the branch was unjustified, that as all the branches of the Company formed one unit, the retrenchment should be done according to "all India seniority basis" and that the workmen had a legal right to get employment in the other branches. A copy of this representation was sent to the Punjab Government, which issued a notification on February 2, 1959, referring the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, punjab, under s. (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "the Act. " The reference was in these terms : "Whether the retrenchment of the following workmen of Ambala Branch of the Indian cable Company Ltd. , is justified and legal under the provisions of section 25 G of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the seniority of workmen in all the branches of the company was pooled for the purpose of effecting retrenchment If not, to what relief are the following workmen entitled -
(2.) Then follow the names of the six workmen. Before the Tribunal, the appellant raised certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the reference. By its order dated August 17, 1959, the Tribunal overruled these objections. Then the matter was heard on the merits, and on February 11, 1960, the Tribunal pronounced its award directing the appellant to take back the "six workmen in their employment with effect from 8-5-1958 so that there is no break in the continuity of service of any of them" and to pay them "their full wages from 8-5-1958 till the. date they are absorbed". It is against this award that the present appeal by special leave has been brought.
(3.) The appellant has urged the following contentions in support of this appeal: (1) The Tribunal was not competent to entertain or adjudicate on the reference. (2) The Punjab Government was not competent to make the order of reference dated February 2, 1959. (3) The disputes of the workmen were individual disputes and not industrial disputes as defined in the Act and that, in consequence the Government had no power to refer the same for adjudication. (4) The branch at Ambala was an industrial establishment within s. 25g and that having been closed no relief could be granted to the workmen under that section (1) The question as to the competence of the tribunal to entertain or adjudicate on the reference could shortly be disposed of as it is covered by our decisions in The Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. Their wokmen (1) and M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. v. Shri A. N. Gujral and others (2) with which the present appeal was heard. The material facts bearing on this question are that Shri A. N. Gujral was appointed to the Industrial Tribunal on April 28, 1953, when he was over sixty years of age. The validity of his appointment is impugned on the ground that it is not in accordance with s. 7 (3) (c) of the Act. Then, on April 9, 1957, Shri A. N. 'gujral was appointed as presiding officer of a new Tribunal constituted under s. 7c of the Act. The validity of this appointment is attacked on the ground that as his appointment as Tribunal on April 28, 1953, was invalid he was not qualified to be appointed under s. 7a (3) (b) of the Act. Then again, under s. 7c (b) , shri A. N. Gujral would have had to retire on June 4, 1957, when he would have attained the age of sixty-five. But the Punjab Legislature then enacted Act 8 of 1957 raising the age of retirement under s. 70 (b) from sixty-five to sixty-seven. This law, it is said, is repugnant to Art. 14 of the constitution as its object was to benefit one individual Shri A. N. Gujral and the notifications under the Act extending his term of office from time to time are inoperative. The present reference which was made to him on February 2, 1959, is said to be invalid on the ground that shri Gujral was not validly in office. On June 4, 1959, the term of office of Shri A. N. Gujral expired, and Shri Passey, retired Judge of the punjab High Court was appointed as Tribunal in his place. The present reference came up before him and resulted in the award dated February 11, 1960, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. It is said that as the reference was not validly pending before Shri A. N. Gujral, Shri passey was not seized of it as his successor and that as there was no fresh reference to him, the proceedings are without jurisdiction and void. We have held in our Judgments in The Atlas Cycle industries case. (1) and Mis Dalmia Dadri Cement case, (2) that the notification dated April 28, 1953, appointing Shri A. N. Gujral as Tribunal under s. 7 (3) of the Act and the notification dated April 19, 1957, appointing him as the Presiding Officer under s. 7c are valid, that the Punjab Act 8 of 1957 is not unconstitutional, and the notifications extending the tenure of office of Shri A. N. Gujral till June 4, 1959, are intra-vires. Following these decisions, we must overrule this contention. (2) We shall next consider the question as to the competence of the Punjab Government to make the order of reference dated February 2, 1959. The contention of the appellant is that after the closure of the branch at Ambala on May 8, 1958, it had no place of business in the State of Punjab, and that, in consequence, on February 2, 1959, the government of Punjab had no jurisdiction to make the reference. Section 10 of the Act provides that when an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the appropriate Government may refer it to a tribunal for adjudication. Section 2 (a) defines appropriate Government as meaning the Central government in relation to certain classes of disputes and State Government in relation to other industrial disputes. It is common ground that the dispute with which we are concerned is not one falling within the jurisdiction of the Central government and that it is only the State Government that has the competence to make the reference. The point in controversy is as to which of the States has jurisdiction to do so. The Act contains no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagia, c. J. observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Vin and other (1) : "But what we are concerned with to decide is : where did the dispute substantially arise Now, the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction, a court or tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction. ";