Mudholkar, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in an appeal from the judgment of a single judge of that Court. The claim in appeal before the High Court was for about 26 lakhs of rupees. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant applied for a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The judgment of the High Court in appeal was in affirmance of the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing the appellant's suit for damages and, therefore, it was necessary for the appellant to establish that a substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the question raised concerned the interpretation to be placed on certain clauses of the managing agency agreement upon which their claim in the suit was founded and that its the interpretation placed by the appeal court on those clauses was erroneous and thus deprived them of the claim to a substantial amount the matter deserved to be certified by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The learned judges dismissed the application without a judgment apparently following their previous decision in Kaikhushroo Pirojsha Ghiara vs. C. P. Syndicate Ltd., 50 Bom LB 744. The appellants, therefore, moved this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution for grant of special leave which was granted. In the application for special leave the appellant had raised a specific contention to the effect that the view taken by the High Court with regard to the application for certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution was wrong, that the appellant was entitled to appeal to this Court as a matter of right and that while considering the appeal this question should also be decided. The appellant pointed out that the view taken by the Bombay High Court on the point as to what is a substantial question of law runs contrary to the decision of the Privy Council in Raghunath Prasad Singh vs. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh, 54 Ind App 126: "and the decision of some High Courts in India and that therefore, it is desirable that this Court should pronounce upon the question in this appeal and set the matter at rest. We think that it is eminently desirable that the point should be considered in this appeal."
(2.) It is not disputed before us that the question raised by the appellant in the appeal is one of law because what the appellant is challenging is the interpretation placed upon certain clauses of the managing agency agreement which are the foundation of the claim in suit. Indeed it is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily raises a question of law.
(3.) The next question is whether the interpretation of a document of the kind referred to above raises a substantial question of law. For, Art. 133 (1) provides that where the judgment, decree or final order appealed, from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-cl. (c) an appeal shall be to this Court if the High Court certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. To the same effect are the provisions of S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the old Judicial Commissioner's Court of Oudh the view was taken that a substantial question of law meant a question of general importance. Following that view its successor, the Chief Court of oudh, refused to grant a certificate to one Raghunath Prasad Singh whose appeal it had dismissed. The appellant, therefore, moved the Privy Council for special leave on the ground that the appeal raised a substantial question of law. The Privy Council granted special leave to the appellant and while granting it made the following observation in their judgment: "Admittedly here the decision of the Court affirmed the decision of the Court immediately below and, therefore, the whole question turns upon whether there is a substantial question of law. There seems to have been some doubt, at any rate in the old court of Oudh, to which the present court succeeded as to whether a substantial question of law meant a question of general importance. Their Lordships think it is quite clear-and indeed it was conceded by Mr. De Gruyther-that that is not the meaning but that "substantial question of law" is substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved." (p. 128 of Ind App). Then their Lordships observed that as the case had occupied the High Court for a very long time and on which a very elaborate judgment was delivered the appeal on its face raised as between the parties a substantial question of law. This case is reported in 54 Ind App 126. What is a substantial question of law as between the parties would certainly depend upon the facts and circumstances of every case. Thus, for instance, if a question of law had been settled by the highest court of the country the question of law however important or difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however much it may affect any of the parties would cease to be a substantial question of law. Nor, again, would a question of law which is palpably absurd be a substantial question of law as between the parties. The Bombay High Court, however, in their earlier decision already adverted to have not properly appreciated the test laid down by the Privy Council for ascertaining what is a substantial question of law. Apparently the judgment of the Privy Council was brought to their notice for, though they do not make a direct reference to it, they have observed as follows: "The only guidance that we have had from the Privy Council is that substantial question is not necessarily a question which is of public importance. It must be a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved. But here again it must not be forgotten that what is contemplated, is not a question of law alone; it must be a substantial question. One can define it negatively. For instance, if there is a well established principle of law and that principle is applied to a given set of facts, that would certainly not be a substantial question of law. Where the question of law is not well settled or where there is some doubt as to the principle of law involved, it certainly would raise a substantial question of law which would require a final adjudication by the highest Court." One of the points which the learned judges of the Bombay High Court had to consider in this case was whether the question of the construction to be placed upon a decree was a substantial question of law. The learned Judges said in their judgment that the decree was undoubtedly of a complicated character but even so they refused to grant a certificate under S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure for appeal to the Federal Court because the construction which the Court was called upon to place on the decree did not raise a substantial question of law. They have observed that even though a decree may be of a complicated character what the Court has to do is to look at its various provisions and draw its inference therefrom. Thus according to the learned Judges merely because the inference to be drawn is from a complicated decree no substantial question of law would arise. Apparently in coming to this conclusion they omitted to attach sufficient weight to the view of the Privy Council that a question of law is "a substantial question of law" when it affects the rights of the parties to the proceeding. Further the learned Judges seem to have taken the view that there should be a doubt in the mind of the Court as to the principle of law involved and unless there is such doubt in its mind the question of law decided by it cannot be said to be "a substantial question of law" so as to entitle a party to a certificate under S. l10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is true that they have not said in so many words that such a doubt must be entertained by the Court itself but that is what we understand their judgment to mean and in particular the last sentence in the portion of their judgment which we have quoted above. ;